Trade Policies

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EXPERT OBSERVER
China’s economy contracted by the most since 1992 in the March quarter – as expected – as government coronavirus (COVID-19) containment measures shut down large swathes of the world’s second largest economy.
This week the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that China’s annual economic growth rate for 2020 would average 1.2 per cent. Should this eventuate, it would be the slowest growth rate since the final year of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, reflecting the huge economic and social toll wrought by the virus.
That said, it appears that some ‘green shoots’ are emerging on China’s supply side. Bloomberg economists estimate that China’s back-to-work rate had climbed to around 95 per cent by April 10 with some coronavirus-enforced restrictions being eased. Data from Bloomberg also shows that larger industrial enterprises – oil refineries, steel mills and construction companies – have mostly resumed operations. In addition, around 85 per cent of small business reported being back at work last week.
And in promising news for Aussie exporters, China’s Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development has advised that 85 per cent of housing-related and municipal infrastructure projects - that were delayed due to COVID-19 enforced shutdowns - had resumed construction on April 1.
On Thursday, China’s central bank Governor Yi Gang said, “Chinese economic growth is resilient”. And judging by China’s historic-high total new credit data in March, it appears policymakers are willing to provide solid support to the COVID-19 ravaged economy.
The People’s Bank of China have continued to cut lending rates and reduce funding costs, supporting credit expansion. And in another positive sign, China’s residential home prices lifted in March on the back of pent-up demand following February’s lockdown. On the demand side, international trade data was better-than-expected in March, but that will be short-lived with major trading partners now grappling with their “lockdown recessions.”
What do the figures show? The Chinese economy (GDP) contracted by 9.8 per cent in the March quarter (forecast: -12.0 per cent). GDP contracted at a 6.8 per cent annual rate in the year to March (forecast: -6.5 per cent), following a 6 per cent expansion in the year to December. It was the sharpest contraction in economic activity since at least 1992 when official GDP records began.
Retail sales fell at a 15.8 per cent annual rate (forecast: -10 per cent) after declining at a 20.5 per cent annual rate in the year to January/February. Over the year to March, spending fell the most on restaurants &amp; catering (down 46.8 per cent), clothing (down 34.8 per cent), jewellery (down 30.1 per cent), household electronics (down 29.7 per cent), furniture (down 22.7 per cent) and motor vehicles (down 18.1 per cent). But spending lifted on food (up 19.2 per cent), medicine (up 8 per cent), telecommunications (up 6.5 per cent) and office supplies (up 6.1 per cent).
Industrial production fell at a 1.1 per cent annual rate in March (forecast: -6.2 per cent) after declining at a 13.5 per cent rate in January/February. Over the year to March, production fell the most for manufacturing (down 1.8 per cent), followed by power supply and energy (down 1.6 per cent). But mining was up 4.2 per cent. By industry, auto manufacturing fell by 22.4 per cent, but pharmaceuticals (up 10.4 per cent) and telecommunications (up 9.9 per cent) both rose the most.
Fixed-asset investment fell at a 16.1 per cent annual rate in March (forecast: -15 per cent) after declining at a 24.5 per cent rate in January/February. Over the year to March, investment fell by the most for the private sector (down 18.8 per cent) followed by state-owned enterprises (down 12.8 per cent). By industry, investment by textiles (down 37.1 per cent), general equipment (down 32.1 per cent), and railways and ships (down 31.6 per cent) fell the most. But investment in utilities rose by 2 per cent.
Chinese property investment fell at a 7.7 per cent annual rate over the year to March following a 16.3 per cent contraction over the year to January/February.
The unemployment rate (nationwide survey-based jobless rate) fell from record high of 6.2 per cent in January/February to 5.9 per cent in March.
What are the implications for interest rates and investors?
While China’s economy is expected to bounce-back in the June quarter – supported by a lift in infrastructure spending, lower interest rates and reduced bank borrowing costs – the recovery in 2020 is expected to be modest. In fact, CommBank Group economists are predicting annual growth of just 3 per cent this year as labour market strains hold back consumer spending.
The long road back to recovery is no more evident than in China’s jobs market. A recent study by China’s Peking University shows that the number of new positions on offer shrunk by 27 per cent in the March quarter, led by recruitment cuts among exporters and foreign enterprises. And round 2.3 million people received unemployment insurance in January and February, according to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. A Reuters poll of economists estimates that nearly 30 million jobs may be lost in China in 2020, crimping consumer spending.
And on the demand side, external headwinds are intensifying as China’s major trading partners endure deep recessions. Government containment efforts in the US, UK, Europe and Australia to contain the pandemic - including business shutdowns, travel bans and social distancing measures – will continue to adversely impact trade, supply chains and demand for Chinese goods.
The IMF expects the Chinese economy to rebound by 9.2 per cent in 2021. If this forecast is realised or exceeded, Australia’s own road to recovery will be enhanced. But our economic dependence on China is likely to be questioned after we emerge from the crisis.
Preliminary Australian March international trade data is scheduled for Thursday March 23.
RYAN FELSMAN is a Senior Economist at CommSec
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Coronavirus causes China's GDP to fall for the first time ever

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The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) is set to return to a holding pattern, leaving the cash rate at 1.00%, according to the latest survey data from Finder.com.au.
In the latest Finder RBA Cash Rate Survey™ 44 of the 46 experts and economists (96%) predict the board will hold at the August meeting to let the June and July cuts trickle through the economy.
Almost all experts (92%, 38) expect the next cash rate move will be a cut. Nearly half (49%, 21) are predicting a final low of 0.50%, while a third (35%, 15) tip believe it will bottom out at 0.75%.
But the holding pattern may not last long; the most popular months cited for another cash rate cut are November (35%, 17) followed by October (23%, 11).
Graham Cooke, insights manager at Finder, said with the effects of recent cuts still unrealised, the board is hesitant to cut in three consecutive months.
“The jury’s out on the impact of these most recent cuts – it’s simply too soon to tell.
“Economists feel slightly more confident that recent cuts will have a positive effect on the economy once given time to roll out. While positivity is generally still low, housing affordability remains the most positive economic element.” 
<img src="https://www.urban.com.au/images/2019/8/5/Finder%20-%20August%206%20-%201.JPG" alt="">
“The falling cash rate combined with falling house prices creates a catch-22 for Aussies looking to break into the property market. Buyers will be wanting to take advantage of historically low rates, but also wanting to purchase at the bottom of the market.”
Despite US rate cut, economists are focused on China When asked to indicate their two main economic concerns for Australia right now, decisions by the Federal Reserve in the US ranked towards the bottom of the list, being cited by just three economists (5%).
(Note: some responses were submitted just before the first US cash rate cut since 2008, which saw its lending rate fall to 2.25%.)
Instead, (27%, cited by 17 respondents) experts tipped international relations like the fate of US-China Trade Deal and Australian-Chinese trade in general (14%, 9) as massive concerns for the economy, above issues like unemployment, inflation and housing prices.
“What’s happening between China, Australia and the US right now could have far more potential impact on Australia than the Fed Reserve,” Cooke said.
“If the US and China can finally agree on a trade deal, this may result in US imports replacing Australian ones in some Chinese sectors.
“With Australian beef and dairy being particularly strong trade commodities in this space right now, such a deal could be bad for Aussie farmers, and ultimately our economy.”
Peter Boehm of KVB Kunlun said domestic concerns are just part of the equation.
“The impact of international trade negotiations will also play an important role in determining the need or otherwise for another rate adjustment.”
<img src="https://www.urban.com.au/images/2019/8/5/Finder%20-%20August%206%20-%202.JPG" alt="">
Results from Finder’s Economic Sentiment Tracker™, which gauges five key indicators – housing affordability, employment, wage growth, cost of living and household debt – show nearly all tipped more positive this month following the second rate cut.
Introduced in March 2018, this month’s tracker set an all-time low for economic sentiment in cost of living (3%).
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Cash rate will hold meanwhile concerns over China-US relations grow

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EXPERT OBSERVER
Since Donald Trump was elected President back on November 8, 2016 we have focused on whether we will see Trump the rabble-rousing populist or Trump the business-friendly pragmatist.
Despite lots of noise – particularly via Trump’s frequent tweets – for the most part Trump the pragmatist has dominated so far.
But we have clearly seen a swing to Trump the populist this year – raising risks for investors.
So far Trump has been good for markets In the period since his election US shares are up 34%, global shares are up 28% and Australian shares are up 21%.
While the strength in share markets would have occurred anyway given stronger global growth, US tax reform, fiscal stimulus and deregulation have clearly helped and contributed to the US share market’s outperformance.
While US tax reform and tax cuts have received much focus, the Trump administration’s focus on deregulation is equally as significant with the US under Trump seeing the least amount of new economically significant regulation since the Reagan Administration in the early 1980s. 
In terms of tax reform and deregulation the Trump Administration has much in common with Reaganomics.
Populism starting to dominate pragmatism
This year though the balance has shifted towards a greater emphasis on populist policies – notably protectionism and criticism of China, the return to sanctions on Iran and arguably recent criticism of the Fed for raising interest rates and pushing up the US dollar.
There are several reasons for this shift in emphasis: the pro-business element of Trump’s policies were mainly completed last year; it’s a mid-term election year so Trump is back in campaign mode; Trump’s approval rating has improved despite this year’s controversial policies suggesting firm support for them from his Republican party base; and the strength of the US economy has also emboldened him.
In fact, it could be argued that last year was all about bolstering the US economy ahead of this year’s more controversial policies.
The main risks around President Trump centre around five key issues: the rising risk of a full-blown trade war; the expanding budget deficit; the risk of interference in the Fed; the return of sanctions on Iranian oil exports threatening wider Middle East conflict; and the risk Trump ultimately comes into trouble with the Mueller inquiry.
We will now look at each of these in turn.
Rising trade war risks
This issue has been done to death but won’t go away.
So far the tariff increases actually implemented amount to just 3% of total US imports.
While this has been met with proportional retaliation by other countries it’s a long way from a full-blown global trade war.
However, the issue is what happens next.
Another $US16bn of Chinese imports will likely be hit with a 25% tariff soon and the US is readying a 10% tariff on another $US200bn.
Trump is also threatening to raise tariffs on all $US550bn of Chinese imports.
China is threatening to retaliate proportionally although it will have to be with other means as it only imports $US130bn from the US.
Trump is also threatening to put tariffs on auto imports and looking at Uranium.
News of a deal between the US and the EU to work towards zero tariffs on industrial goods is good news in terms of heading of a full-blown trade war between the two, but negotiations have a long way to go.
There was hope of a deal with China in May – with Trump initially crowing about a May 20 trade deal, but since then both China and the US have dug in with Trump tapping popular support for protectionism and anti-Chinese sentiment.
So, the trade threat could get still worse before it gets better which means it risks taking the edge off economic growth.
Modelling by Citigroup of a 10% tariff hike by the US, China and Europe showed a 2% hit to global GDP after a year.
Of course, we are not seeing a tariff hike on all goods but the impact could still be significant if negotiations with the EU and China fail and all the tariffs being talked about are implemented.
There are a few offsetting factors.
First, China is moving to provide stimulus to support growth.
Second, much of Trump’s approach still looks designed to apply “maximum pressure” to reach a negotiated outcome – and so far so good in relation to Europe.
And Trump knows that the costs to US workers (from soybean farmers to Harley Davidson workers) and consumers will escalate as more tariffs are imposed.
So, our base case remains that some form of negotiated solution will be reached, but in relation to China this may not occur until next year.
Interference in the Fed and US dollar Trump’s recent comments criticising Europe, China and others for helping drive the US dollar up and the Fed for raising interest rates naturally raises concerns that he will intervene in foreign exchange markets and interfere with the Fed.
The comments lack economic logic – if “making America great again” means stronger US economic growth then it also means higher US interest rates and a higher US dollar – and maybe the Fed came in for a serve after Fed Chair Powell observed that “countries that have gone in a more protectionist direction have done worse”!
Trump’s annoyance may have been triggered by the slide in the value of the Chinese Renminbi.
While this looks to be mainly a strong $US story (as the $US is up around 7% against its low earlier this year against a range of currencies compared to an 8% gain against the Renminbi) the Chinese authorities seem quite content to let it fall for now and this will obviously offset Trump’s tariffs on Chinese goods.
Despite all this it’s unlikely in the short term that Trump will act on his opinions on rates and the $US.
US Treasury Secretary Mnuchin said the administration would “not interfere with the decisions of the Fed or move to manipulate the value of the dollar.” Trump is well known to be a high debt/low interest rate guy so it’s no surprise he is not happy with rising rates.
But the Fed answers to Congress, has a mandate to keep inflation down and will do what it sees best – which with strong growth and at target inflation means returning interest rates to more normal levels.
However, longer term there is a risk that Trump will weaken the institution of an independent central bank targeting low inflation and may also seek to return to a more interventionist approach regarding the US dollar, particularly if America’s trade deficit refuses to fall.
Based on past experience such political intervention would risk much higher inflation which would be a big negative for investment assets as the revaluation that occurred as we moved from high inflation to low inflation would reverse.
Fortunately, we are not there yet.
 The expanding US budget deficit
It’s been the norm for the US budget deficit to blow out when unemployment rises (as tax revenue falls and jobless claims go up) and decline when unemployment falls.
Thanks to Trump’s fiscal stimulus it’s now blowing out when unemployment is collapsing and looks to be on its way to 5% of GDP.
This raises three risks. First, it may mean higher than otherwise interest rates and bond yields as the Fed may have to raise rates more than would otherwise be the case to stop the economy overheating and the Government’s competition for funds results in higher bond yields. 
So far there is not a lot of evidence of this with US bond yields remaining relatively low – presumably held down by low global bond yields and trade war fears – but its still a risk as US inflationary pressures rise.
Second and more fundamentally it begs the question of debt sustainability when the next recession arrives given US public debt is already around 100% of US GDP.
Finally, US fiscal stimulus by adding to the US savings-investment imbalance is adding to the US trade deficit and so is completely inconsistent with his trade policies.
Even if there was a completely level playing field on world trade America will still have a trade deficit!
The return to sanctions on, and tensions with, Iran Perhaps a big surprise this year for some has been that President Trump looks to have swapped a half decent deal with Iran for a dodgy one with North Korea.
While the latter holds out the hope of (maybe) reducing the threat of a nuclear attack on the US, the return to sanctions and tensions with Iran risks higher oil prices. S
ince the lows of 2015 oil prices have increased by 70% reflecting increased demand and OPEC’s 2016 cutback.
Global stockpiles and spare capacity have been rundown and supply from Libya and Venezuela is uncertain.
Our base case is that demand growth will be more constrained from here and that a ramp up in US shale oil production will help contain oil prices around $US70-75 a barrel.
The risk though is that the loss of around 800,000 barrels a day of Iranian oil exports and the renewed risk of wider conflict in the Middle East associated with Iran (eg, if Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz through which 20% of global oil supply moves in retaliation against US sanctions) results in higher prices.
The Mueller inquiry into Russian links
Our view in relation to the Mueller inquiry remains that unless Trump has done something very wrong the Republican controlled House will not move to impeach him and even if a Democrat controlled House post the mid-terms did, the Senate will not have the necessary two thirds of votes to remove him from office.
However, his sensitivity over the issue, along with his comments seemingly favouring Russian President Putin’s word over US security agencies does remind a bit of Nixon in relation to Watergate.
So his removal cannot be ruled out.
But this would just mean VP Mike Pence would take over with basically the same economic policies (but with less tweet noise) and economic conditions are stronger than in 1974.
Trump tweet noise
The risks around Trump are real and need to be watched carefully.
But Trump generates a lot of noise and much of it is contradictory and confusing – in the last week Trump tweeted “Tariffs are the greatest” only to tweet 12 hours later that “I have an idea for them. Both the US and EU drop all tariffs” – and often reflects bluster ahead of negotiations – recall his “fire, fury and frankly power” threat to North Korea.
So the best approach for investors in relation to Trump is to turn down the noise.
Dr Shane Oliver is the Head of Investment Strategy and Chief Economist for AMP Capital
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