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GUEST OBSERVER
"We’ve had 25 years of continuous economic growth, the only country in the world with a period of growth that long. – Trade minister Steven Ciobo, speaking on Q&amp;A, May 31, 2016."
Economic management is shaping up as a key election battleground, and the Coalition has been especially keen to keep the focus on the economy.
Trade minister Steven Ciobo told Q&amp;A viewers that Australia has had 25 years of continuous economic growth, and is the only country in the world with a period of growth that long.
Is that right?
<h2>Checking the source</h2>
A spokesman for Steven Ciobo told The Conversation that Ciobo misspoke on Q&amp;A. The spokesman said by email that:
Mr Ciobo omitted the world developed, he meant to say “developed country”.
That clarification does improve the accuracy of his statement quite considerably. Let’s test his two statements separately.
<h2>25 years of continuous economic growth?</h2>
Australia entered a period of low and sometimes negative economic growth in 1989. The last period where growth was negative was June 1991 (for the quarter-over-quarter growth), and December 1991 (for the year-over-year growth).
I would argue that the weak growth through 1991 means that you can’t say that the economy recovered and was growing until 1992.
So on that definition, we have had about 24.5 continuous growth – which is close enough to the Ciobo’s figure of 25 years.
It is true we are in our 25th year of consecutive economic growth. That’s how it was phrased in Austrade’s 2016 Why Australia Benchmark Report, which noted that:
Australia is not only entering its 25th year of consecutive growth, the country is expected to realise annual real GDP growth of 2.9% between 2016 and 2020 – the fastest of any major advanced economy in the world.
<h2>The only country in the world?</h2>
As the minister’s spokesman said, Ciobo accidentally omitted the word “developed” from his statement.
It is true that all of the other 33 member countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have had a period of negative GDP growth since 1991, with most going into recession during the Global Financial Crisis.
It is notable that the dip in growth during the GFC was smaller for the Group of 20 (G20) major economies than for the OECD, and the reason for this is that many emerging markets did not go into recession.
It is not true to say, as the minister accidentally did, that Australia is the only country in the world with a period of growth that long. The chart below shows Australia’s growth next to the G20, OECD, India and China.
<a href="/images/2016/06/06/image-20160531-13810-hgnto5.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="/images/2016/06/06/image-20160531-13810-hgnto5.png" alt="">
<h4>Author provided. Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators and Emerging Markets database in DX database.</h4>
The chart shows that China and India, the two most important emerging economies, also have had positive growth in GDP in the past 25 years. It is now more than 25 years since both countries began their economic reform programs, and both countries have enjoyed very strong economic growth over this period.
<h2>Verdict</h2>
The statement that Australia has had 25 years of continuous economic growth is mostly correct.
The statement that Australia is the only country in the world to have had such a period of unbroken growth is incorrect. But it’s true Australia is the only one out of 34 OECD member countries to have had positive economic growth since 1991.  
Mark Crosby is associate professor of Economics, Melbourne Business School and author for The Conversation. He can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/mark-crosby-444" target="_blank">here</a>.
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Has Australia had 25 years of continuous economic growth?

From strength to resilience: APRA chairman Wayne Byres

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GUEST OBSERVER
A new report by JLL says it is time to review pre - Global Financial Crisis yardsticks to judge future investment performance for commercial real estate.  Instead, investors need to look more broadly at the long-term structural changes to the market that have been underway, behind the scenes.
And don’t wait for ‘normal’ market conditions to return, as traditional real estate benchmarks may not be reliable indicators in the future.  Some metrics, such as workspace ratios and retail turnover ratios, may no longer even be relevant in the shifting world of workplace mobility and IT connectivity.
The Report - ‘Real Estate Conundrums - Just another cycle – or a whole new ball game?’ was presented at a JLL Research event in Sydney.
Technology and urbanisation have been gathering pace for decades.  But while the cyclical nature of real estate has not been abolished, investors in real estate face a range of conundrums relating to yields, cross border investment, technology and urbanisation that can have long-term impacts for commercial real estate.
<a href="/images/2016/06/16/Screen%20Shot%202016-06-16%20at%208.26.15%20AM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="/images/2016/06/16/Screen%20Shot%202016-06-16%20at%208.26.15%20AM.png" alt="">
The GFC has been a convenient scapegoat for the breakdown in previously trusted rules of thumb when investing in commercial real estate.  While for some the benchmarks of the years 2007-2008 do seem to mark a clear break from the patterns of the past, many trends have been evident for far longer than that.  Not everything is a GFC-driven event. For instance, real and nominal interest rates have been declining for 30 years.
The challenge for investors right now is that numerous structural and cyclical shifts are emerging, converging and interacting with each other.
Structural shifts for Australian commercial real estate:
<ul>
<li>Real estate markets are globalising – tenants, investors, developers</li>
<li>
Yields: Low growth, low inflation, low yields are also here to stay</li>
<li>
Cross Border Investment: Offshore capital is here to stay</li>
<li>Fundamental mismatch between capital and available assets</li>
</ul>
Market cycles have not been abolished:
<ul>
<li>Yields will cycle around lower benchmark levels</li>
<li>
Demography a key driver of all real estate asset classes</li>
<li>Financial markets move faster than physical markets</li>
<li>Don’t wait for ‘normal’ conditions to return</li>
</ul>
Structural Shifts – Yields and Cross Border Investment:
Implicit in JLL Research forecasts is a downward structural shift in interest rates and real estate yields – in other words, the ‘lower for longer’ theory is correct.  This does not mean that cycles have been abolished.  But average yields are likely to be lower than in the past.
<a href="/images/2016/06/16/Screen%20Shot%202016-06-16%20at%208.28.57%20AM.png" target="_blank">Click to enlarge</a>
<img src="/images/2016/06/16/Screen%20Shot%202016-06-16%20at%208.28.57%20AM.png" alt="">
Supported by growth in global pools of capital and a search for yield, JLL calculates that global cross border investment will continue to grow over the medium term.  In Australia, cross border investors accounted for 42 percent of all commercial property transactions in 2015.
While the impact of technology has been massive, the impact on real estate has been less than was anticipated 20 years ago; CBD’s remain magnets for office and retail tenants, despite rising travel and congestion costs, and inner-city residential demand (which was not foreseen) has increased substantially.
Perhaps though the falling cost of technology, the advent of wireless capabilities, combined with the rising cost and scarcity of skilled labour and rising wages (that puts a premium on commuting travel times) will now lead to a more substantial impact on real estate investment returns and a re-ranking of market values in CBD and non-CBD locations? 
If location premiums erode, non-CBD and suburban locations could be rewarding for investors.
Demography (and urbanization): – is it destiny?
Are we under-estimating the impact of the changing population age profile?  Baby-boomers and first home buyers are important – but over time there are many other impacts on real estate to consider – childcare, student housing, retirement living as well as the age profile within the working age population. 
While population will grow across all age categories in Australia, some age groups will grow much faster than others – therefore requiring specific real estate solutions – right across the spectrum from childcare, student accommodation, first home buyers, upgraders, empty nesters and retirement villages.
 
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David Rees is regional director, head of research, JLL Australasia and can be contacted <a href="https://www.jll.com.au/australia/en-au/people/113/david-rees" target="_blank">here.</a>
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Time to review pre-GFC yardsticks to judge future performance of commercial real estate: JLL's David Rees

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I was reading a piece this week at MacroBusiness where it was pointed out that it has been 24 years since we went through the global recession.
Then eight years later we went into the Tech Wreck, then  eight years after that we hit the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and now  eight years on we have hit Brexit – or as Australians will soon call it Bex – it (as it will probably cause some major headaches.)
Whilst Australia continues to post some very positive data, we need to pay closer attention to the data post June 30 as we now enter a period of uncertainty. Having said that, this should also be viewed as an exciting time as it is now clear that every eight years businesses need to adapt and recalibrate in order to survive.
One statistic we can’t hide from when the GFC hit in 2007 is that debt has grown much faster than GDP in every country. Some may say that this is an economic consequence as globally cash rates have been crashing down where in Australia we sit at a record low 1.75 per cent. Furthermore, many commentators are now stating that the cash rate in Australia will come down even more as a direct result of Brexit.
Whenever an economy reaches that financial standoff, and investors hate uncertainty, we need to be overly protective of investors as they are a particular and crucial economy driver. So there needs to be closer scrutiny as to why the ALP want to change the Negative Gearing goal posts, which will definitely drive up rents, and why the NSW Government wants to drive foreign investors from our property markets with their 4 per cent surcharge plus a 0.75 per cent land tax surcharge on residential real estate only.
Makes one seriously question exactly where governments expect the new buyers to evolve from? The real estate industry is hearing foreign investors are moving away from our markets in droves. Once again we need to be mindful of Brexit and life and results after June 30. Australia is now all but guaranteed that lending will now tighten, which is a good thing, however if we cast our minds back to the GFC we kept hearing two words – “green shoots”.
The sad part about emerging “green shoots” is that governments immediately see them as a new form of taxation – this in turn will bring about market stagnation which is the last thing our economy needs.
Having said that, existing property markets, otherwise known as the established household markets, are now 60 per cent down when compared to property listings two years ago. This is good news for established houses – we are now seeing record low listings which only strengthens the markets. For example, when I go back five years for Mosman houses you will see the pattern that has emerged.
<ul>
<li>30 June 2011 – 97 houses on the market in Mosman</li>
<li>30 June 2012 – 80 houses on the market in Mosman</li>
<li>30 June 2013 – 68 houses on the market in Mosman</li>
<li>30 June 2014 – 63 houses on the market in Mosman</li>
<li>30 June 2015 – 43 houses on the market in Mosman</li>
<li>30 June 2016 – 42 houses on the market in Mosman</li>
</ul>
What this tells us, and we should point out that these results are reflective across Sydney, is that since the GFC homeowners are taking advantage of record low cash rates by paying down debt faster. On the flip side they are renovating over selling as they see no economies of scale in donating a few hundred thousand dollars to our NSW Government in the form of Stamp Duty. In other words, the Stamp Duty component is then redirected to home renovations.
The NSW Government will recognise very quickly that it has a cash flow problem when the effect of the new surcharge stamp duty and the already declining established markets see the property market transactions coming to an abrupt halt. Don’t be surprised to see a total back-flip with the foreign buyer surcharges but not the land tax.
As for the established household markets the NSW Government should look at the amount of stamp duty previously paid on the past acquisition and give that household a 33 per cent deduction from the next stamp duty so long as that household has been in that property between five and ten years.
In business you offer incentives – it’s a shame governments struggle with the concept of that word.
<h5>MOSMAN – 2088</h5>
Number of houses on the market this time last year – 36
Number of houses on the market last week – 48
Number of houses on the market this week – 42
Number of apartments on the market this time last year – 33
Number of apartments on the market last week – 41
Number of apartments on the market this week – 33
<h5>CREMORNE – 2090</h5>
Number of houses on the market this time last year – 3
Number of houses on the market last week – 11
Number of houses on the market this week – 7
Number of apartments on the market this time last year – 16
Number of apartments on the market last week – 18
Number of apartments on the market this week – 17
<h5>NEUTRAL BAY – 2089</h5>
Number of houses on the market this time last year – 2
Number of houses on the market last week – 10
Number of houses on the market this week – 10
Number of apartments on the market this time last year – 39
Number of apartments on the market last week – 22
Number of apartments on the market this week – 23
ROBERT SIMEON is a director of <a href="https://www.rwm.com.au/" target="_blank" title="RWM" rel="nofollow">Richardson Wrench Mosman and Neutral Bay</a> and has been selling residential real estate in Sydney since 1985. 
He has also been writing real estate blog <a href="https://www.rwm.com.au/news/" target="_blank" title="Virtual Realty News" rel="nofollow">Virtual Realty News</a> since 2000.
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Time for governments to roll out incentives: Robert Simeon

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EXPERT OBSERVER
Wayne Swan and Kevin Rudd spent big and spent bold, and it almost certainly kept us out of recession. <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/richard-holden-118107"> </a>
A little more than a decade on from the the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the largest bankruptcy in history, many of the world’s advanced economies are only now beginning to recover fully.
I was on the faculty at the University of Chicago at the time and, like many, followed the events of the 2008 US summer with a combination of interest and outright fear.
It is hard to describe how scary the two months around the Lehman bankruptcy were. Two anecdotes convey some of that fear, however.
The first was when I spoke to an economics official in the Obama administration who said: “Go get cash and bottled water. Automatic teller machines might not be working two days from now.”
The second reflects just how severely money markets froze up. Goldman Sachs – Wall Street’s most venerable firm – was largely on the good side of trades on credit default swaps, the instruments behind much of the crisis. Yet its stock price was utterly hammered. It wasn’t until legendary investor Warren Buffett sank US$5 billion into Goldman that confidence was restored.
On one day Goldman stock was down by a staggering nearly 50% in intra-day trading. It very nearly went the way of Lehman – all because of what amounted to a modern-day bank run.
<img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236990/original/file-20180918-158246-1o295vy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt="">Goldman &amp; Sachs stock price.
<hr>
The Obama administration responded with spending (including on tax rebates for households and firms), big interest rate cuts and measures to ensure banks had access to funds. Combined, these helped avoid a repeat of the Great Depression.
When Australia splashed cash
Australia, too, spent big: A$10 billion in October 2008 and a further A$42 billion in February 2009. More than half of the second sum, $A26 billion, went on infrastructure. Another $12.7 billion was spent on cash bonuses, including $900 for every Australian on less than $80,000.
And we cut interest rates, massively, and guaranteed bank deposits.
The International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and most good economists think what we did was essential to ensure Australia avoided a severe downturn.
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and his treasurer, Wayne Swan, deserve a lot of credit.
Yet there are those on the conservative side of politics who claim the stimulus spending was wasteful, not that helpful, and locked in an era of higher government spending.
Wasteful? Not really
As prime minister in 2016, Malcolm Turnbull encapsulated the view that the spending was a waste when he <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/interview:-prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull/7542756" target="_blank">told the ABC’s Leigh Sales</a>: “I think what shepherded Australia through the GFC successfully was the Chinese stimulus and the large amount of cash that John Howard left in the bank.”
Here’s what I think.
The Chinese stimulus helped, but China didn’t do it to help Australia. It did it to help itself, with a happy byproduct being continued demand for Australian resources.
Does Mr Turnbull really think the Chinese government was either mistaken (because stimulus spending doesn’t help) or benevolent (because it wanted to help Australia)? These are not terms normally associated with Beijing.
The “large amount of cash” left by the Howard government was indeed very important. It allowed the Rudd government to spend big without running up huge government debt. As the noted UC Berkeley economists Christina and David Romer <a href="https://eml.berkeley.edu/%7Ecromer/Reprints/Crises%20and%20Policy/Romer&amp;RomerCrisesandPolicy.pdf" target="_blank">have pointed out</a>, using evidence from 24 advanced economies, fiscal and monetary policy “space” is important in ensuring the stimulus programs work.
So, yes, Howard’s debt-free budget was important, but only because it gave the government room to spend.
There is an important point here. Namely, that prudent fiscal management through ordinary times is essential in order to build up the firepower to respond in extraordinary times.
Australia still enjoys government debt to GDP that is low by OECD standards, but its growth has been very rapid even in post-crisis years because of the structural gap between government revenues and expenditures. Both sides of politics say they are committed to narrowing it. We shall see.
Space matters
“Space” to act with monetary policy (official interest rates) is also important.
It’s the basis for much of the talk about a “new monetary policy framework” that would lift interest rates from their present lows in Australia and overseas to around 5%. It’s a goal articulately and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-the-fed-needs-a-new-monetary-policy-framework/" target="_blank">forcefully argued for by former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers</a>. Getting there would give central banks the firepower they might need.
These lessons have been learned to varying degrees, but are now thankfully at least part of the mainstream debate.
And regulation
One thing that everyone should have learned from the financial crisis in general, and Lehman in particular, is the need for effective regulation of financial institutions.
The combination of massive leverage, opaque financial instruments and radical interconnectedness of financial firms in the US was a disaster waiting to happen.
In many ways it still could be.
Republicans in the US want to dramatically roll back the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act introduced by President Obama in response to the financial crisis.
Although far from perfect, it helped de-risk the US financial system.
In Australia the failings of financial regulators play out every day at the Hayne Royal Commission, in excruciating detail.
It entitles us to ask if Australian regulators can’t prevent outright theft by financial institutions, how equipped are they to prevent more complicated transactions that might put the financial system at risk?
The answer is: not very.
We’ve learned some things
A decade after Lehman it’s fair to say we have learned lessons.
We know how to use big and bold fiscal (spending) policy and monetary (interest rate) policy to create a virtuous circle of beliefs that can pull us out of a downturn.
And we know that we need to reload both fiscal and monetary policy in the good times so we are ready for the bad times.
But on financial regulation the US might be about to go backwards, and we never really went forwards.<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103514/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important;">
Richard Holden is a Professor of Economics and PLuS Alliance Fellow, UNSW
This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com" target="_blank">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. 
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The GFC and me, ten years on, what have we learned? Richard Holden

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While there has been talk around when interest rates will rise again, it appears that, for now at least, low interest rates might just be the new normal for investors.
After the Reserve Bank kept the interest rate on hold on Tuesday, surprising no one, 1300HomeLoan’s managing director John Kolenda has suggested that, despite continual suggestions of where the future rate may be heading, we’re likely to stick with lows for the foreseeable future. This, he noted, would make low rates the “new normal”.
“Prior to the global financial crisis the norm for the RBA's official rate was around the 5% mark,” he said.
“The historical rates over the last 30 years have been much higher than for the previous few years. Consumer confidence is playing a bigger role in determining rate movements.”
Potential increases over the next six to 12 months will still be low compared to historical rates, he noted.
“Based on the sensitivity of consumers to rate rises, we are likely to see medium term rates at historical lows and smaller variances in movement,” he said.
He claimed that anyone trying to predict a rise is “a brave person” until there’s more positive data broadly, rather than just rising house prices that the Reserve Bank has expressed concerns about.
 “In the current economic climate, the RBA has no choice but to keep rates on hold and likely to tread carefully if they raise sometime later this year,” he said, pointing to weak retail results, a slowdown in the resources sector and unemployment growth as counter balances to a strong housing market.
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Low interest rates may be “new normal”: John Kolenda

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GUET OBSERVER
It seems momentous things happen in years ending in seven.
Well, at least in the last 50 years starting with the “summer of love” in 1967 and the introduction of the Chevrolet Camaro.
But after that, it was downhill with Elvis leaving the building in 1977, the 1987 share market crash, the Asian crisis of 1997 and the GFC that started in 2007.
While Lehman Brothers didn’t go bankrupt until September 2008, the GFC’s initial tremors occurred in 2007.
Financial markets really started to take notice in August of that year, with shares taking a big hit before rebounding to new highs for US and Australian shares in October/November 2007 ahead of a roughly 55% decline into March 2009.
This note looks at the main lessons for investors from the GFC and whether it can happen again.
But first some history.
The GFC was the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression.
It saw the freezing up of lending between banks, multiple financial institutions needing to be rescued, 50% plus share market falls and the worst post-war global economic contraction.
At the core of the GFC was something very basic.
In an environment of low interest rates (with often initially low “teaser” rates) too many loans were made to US homebuyers that set off a housing boom that went bust when interest rates rose and supply surged.
So no big deal – it happens all the time!
But it was what went on around it that ultimately saw it turn into a global crisis.
A massive proportion of the loans (40% or so) went to people who had no ability to service them – sub-prime and low doc borrowers.
Remember NINJA loans – loans to people who had no income, no job and no assets!
And many were non-recourse loans – so borrowers could just hand over the house if its value fell below the debt owed on it and that was the end of their liability.
Recall – jingle mail!
This was encouraged by public policy aimed at boosting home ownership and ending discrimination in lending.
It was made possible by a massive easing in lending standards facilitated by financial innovation that packaged up the sub-prime loans into securities, which were then given AAA ratings on the basis that while a small proportion of loans may default the risk will be offset by the broad exposure.
These securities were then leveraged up and sold all over the world with fancy names like Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) that found willing buyers looking for decent low risk (remember AAA rated!) yield at a time of low interest rates.
Hedge funds investing in such products even got awards like “yield manager of the year”.
But the trouble was that with the sub-prime loans moved out of the banks, there was no “bank manager” looking after them.
This all came as banks globally were sourcing an increasing amount of the money they were lending from global money markets – which had freed them up from relying on expensive bank deposits via bricks and mortar branches.
The music stopped in 2006 when poor affordability, an oversupply of homes and 17 interest rates hikes from the Fed over two years saw US house prices peak and then start to slide.
This made it harder for sub-prime borrowers to refinance their loans at their initial “teaser” rates.
As a result, more and more borrowers defaulted causing investors in the fancy products that invested in sub-prime loans (like CDOs) to start suffering losses.
The problem really caught the attention of global investors in August 2007 after BNP froze redemptions from three of its funds because it couldn’t value the CDOs within them, which in turn set in train a credit crunch with sharp rises in the cost of funding for banks and a reduction in its availability triggering sharp falls in share markets.
Shares rebounded but only to peak in late October/November 2007 before commencing roughly 55% falls as the credit crunch worsened, the global economy fell into recession, mortgage defaults escalated and multiple banks failed.
The crisis went global as: losses mounted; these were magnified by gearing, which forced investment banks and hedge funds to liquidate sound positions to meet redemptions thereby spreading the crisis to other assets; the distribution of securities investing in US sub-prime debt globally led to a wide range of exposed investors and hence greater worries about who was at risk; this all led to a freezing up of lending between banks.
All of which affected confidence and economic activity.
Fault lay with home borrowers, the US Government, lenders, ratings agencies, regulators, and investors and financial organisations for taking on too much risk.
It came to an end in 2009 after significant monetary easing and fiscal stimulus helped restore the normal operation of money markets, confidence and growth.
That said, aftershocks continued with sub-par global growth and very low inflation.
The GFC highlighted several lessons for investors:
· The economic and investment cycle is alive and well. Talk of a “great moderation” was all the rage prior to the GFC but the GFC reminded us yet again that periods of great returns are invariably followed by a fall back. If returns are too good to be true they probably are.
· High returns come with higher risk. While risk is often dormant for years, it usually returns with a vengeance as was apparent in the GFC. Backward-looking measures of volatility are no better than attempting to drive focussed only on the rear view mirror.
· While each boom bust cycle is different, markets are pushed to extremes of valuation and sentiment. The low in 2009 was characterised by ultra cheap shares and credit investments with investors highly pessimistic.
· Be sceptical of financial engineering or hard-to-understand products. The biggest losses for investors in the GFC were generally in products that relied heavily on financial engineering purporting to turn junk into AAA investments that were impossible to understand.
· Avoid too much gearing or gearing of the wrong sort. Gearing is fine when all is going well. But it will magnify losses when things reverse and can force the closure of positions at a big loss when the lenders lose their confidence and refuse to roll over maturing debt or when a margin call occurs forcing an investor to sell their position just at the time they should be adding to it.
· The importance of true diversification. While listed property trusts and hedge funds were popular alternatives to low-yielding government bonds prior to the GFC, through the crisis they ran into big trouble (in fact Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) fell 79%), whereas government bonds were the star performers. REITs have cut their gearing and returned to their knitting. But “in a crisis correlations go to one – except for true safe havens”.
· Fiscal and monetary policy work. There is a role for government in putting free market economies back on track when they get into a downward spiral. While some have argued that easy money just benefitted the rich (who invest in shares), doing nothing would have likely ended with 20% plus unemployment and worse inequality.
· The return to normal from major financial crises can take time, as the blow to confidence depresses lending and borrowing and hence consumer spending and investment for years afterwards. This muscle memory eventually fades but the impact can be seen for a decade or so.
· The importance of asset allocation. The GFC provided an extreme reminder that what really matters for your investment performance is your asset mix – ie your allocation to shares, bonds, cash, property, etc. Exposure to individual shares or fund managers is second order.
· Finally, “stuff happens”. While after each economic crisis there is a desire to “make sure it never happens again”, history tells us that manias, panics and crashes are part and parcel of the process of “creative destruction” that has led to an exponential increase in material prosperity in capitalist countries. The trick is to ensure that the regulation of financial markets minimises the economic fallout that can occur when free markets go astray but doesn’t stop the dynamism necessary for economic prosperity.
Of course there will be another boom and bust...but as Mark Twain is thought to have said “history doesn’t repeat, but it rhymes” so the specifics will be different next time.
History is replete with bubbles and crashes and tells us it’s inevitable that they will happen again as each generation forgets and must relearn the lessons of the past.
Often the seeds for each new bubble are sown in the ashes of the former.
Fortunately, in the post-GFC environment seen so far there has been an absence of broad-based bubbles on the scale of the tech boom or US housing/credit boom.
E-commerce stocks like Facebook and Amazon are a candidate but they have seen nowhere near the gains or infinite PEs seen in the late 1990s tech boom.
Click to enlarge
On the global debt front, a concern is that after a post-GFC pull back, it has grown to an all-time high relative to global GDP.
Click to enlarge
However, just because global debt has grown to a new high doesn’t mean a crisis is upon us.
It has been trending up for decades, much of the growth in debt in developed countries post the GFC has been in public debt and debt interest burdens are low thanks to low interest rates in contrast to the pre-GFC period.
Furthermore, the other signs of signs of excess that normally set the scene for recessions and associated deep bear markets in shares like that seen in the GFC are not present on a widespread basis just now.
Inflation is low, monetary policy globally has barely tightened, there has been no widespread overinvestment in technology (as preceded the tech wreck) or housing (as preceded the GFC in the US) and bank lending standards have not been relaxed to the same degree as seen prior to the GFC.
Moreover, financial regulations have tightened significantly with banks required to have higher capital ratios and source a greater proportion of funds from their depositors.
So another boom bust cycle is inevitable at some point, but it will likely be very different to the GFC.
And many of the signs of excess that normally precede deep bear markets are still absent.
<a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/https://plus.google.com/110172465327488162875?rel=author" target="_blank">SHANE OLIVER</a> is head of investment strategy and economics and chief economist at <a href="https://www.ampcapital.com.au/home" target="_blank">AMP Capital</a> and is responsible for AMP Capital's diversified investment funds.
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Lessons learned a decade from the GFC: Shane Oliver

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Martin North says 60 Minutes took the worst case from his four scenarios as the basis of the alarming segment which went to air last night on Channel 9.
"It is not my central scenario, rated only a 20 percent chance, as I made clear when interviewed," he said noting this caveat did not make it to the final cut.
North suggested a fall of 45 percent in home prices would be over three years or so, and require the US financial markets to react to rising US Fed rates.
Click here <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/images/2018/9/17/north-forecast.jpg" target="_blank">to enlarge.</a>
<img src="https://res.cloudinary.com/dz9xllyip/image/fetch/c_scale,w_580,q_auto:good/https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/po.images/2018/9/17/north-forecast.jpg" alt="">
"This creates a GFC 2.0." North, a finance sector analyst and principal Digital Finance Analytics, suggested.
The 60 Minutes reporter Tom Steinfort advised "several of the experts we interviewed for this story estimate it could be as much as 40 percent in Melbourne and Sydney, while even the most optimistic property analysts concede there will be a drop of at least 10-15 percent."
Steinfort says he's been spooked by the downturn, holding off his desired property purchase with fiancee Claudia Jukic.
His 60 Minutes report kicked off with a serious inaccuracy.
"For as long as most of us care to remember, or perhaps only as long as we want to remember, property prices in Australia have only gone in one direction, at least in our big cities," Steinfort claimed.
CoreLogic's Cameron Kusher recently wrote <a href="https://www.urban.com.au/expert-insights/buying/88574-2018-housing-declines-hit-melbourne-s-inner-east-and-sydney-s-hills-district-hardest-corelogic" target="_blank">a detailed research analysis tracking the current downturn</a> with three downturns since 2003.
North said the figures used in the program did not reflect his “central scenario” and that Channel Nine “chose not to cover” the more likely alternatives.
“My best call would be [property value falls] in the region of 15-20 per cent from top, over two to three years,” he said.
You can read North's full analysis <a href="http://digitalfinanceanalytics.com/blog/updated-finance-and-property-scenarios-summary-findings/" target="_blank">here</a>. 
 
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