Fire Safety

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EXPERT OBSERVATION
Three years have passed since a cladding-fuelled fire claimed 72 lives in Grenfell Tower, London, on June 14 2017. The construction industry and its regulators around the world are still grappling with how to create effective regulations to ensure dwellings are built to keep their occupants safe.
The New South Wales Parliament passed two important bills last week: the Design and Building Practitioners Bill 2020 and the Residential Apartment Buildings (Compliance and Enforcement Powers) Bill 2020. This put in place two important pieces of the “jigsaw puzzle”, as NSW Better Regulation Minister Kevin Anderson put it.
The Residential Apartment Buildings Bill in particular could be a game changer and is the focus of this article. The law is expected to take effect on September 1 2020.
New powers to order serious defects be fixed
The centrepiece of the legislation is an ability for the Secretary of the Department of Customer Service to order the correction of “serious defects” in residential apartment buildings. In practice, the NSW building commissioner and his staff will apply these orders, according to the bill’s second reading speech. Developers can be ordered to rectify building work “if the secretary has a reasonable belief that building work was or is being carried out in a manner that could result in a serious defect”.
The “was” is significant here. These powers of intervention can be used up to ten years after an occupation certificate is issued.
And, to make sure defects are fixed before residents take possession of their apartment, the secretary can issue a “prohibition order” to delay an occupation certificate.
The definition of “serious defect” includes:
failure to comply with performance requirements of the Building Code of Australia
defects likely to deny habitability or use of the building for its intended purpose
use of banned building products.
Other states and territories have in place various provisions to order rectification. However, none of these are as extensive as the new regime in NSW.
In particular, the express power to order rectification after apartments are completed addresses the issue that frustrated the Victorian Building Authority’s 2017 attempt to have the builder rectify non-compliant cladding at the Lacrosse Building in Melbourne. So, the rectification powers are likely, along with the statutory duty of care in the Design and Building Practitioners Bill – also a NSW innovation – to attract interest across the country.
How much will the industry push back?
These measures to rectify defects go to the heart of the commercial drivers that underpin our largely privately delivered apartment stock in Australia. Without an occupation certificate, developers can’t settle the sale of the apartments (usually off-plan). Likewise, their building contractors will typically remain “on the hook” for a raft of obligations under their contracts.
By making defects correction a precondition for issuing the occupation certificate, the new law embraces the “prevention is better than cure” mantra that underpins reforms in Australia and beyond.
To what extent will the industry support this shift? Time will tell.
What can be said is that the reforms add a high level of intervention in the commercial drivers of apartment construction when the industry is already operating under the shadow of COVID-19 and its gathering recession. So it is something of a “wildcard” in an already fraught commercial landscape.
This means developers who do not have adequate measures in place to pass the costs of rectification and delayed occupation down the contractual chain are likely to resort to the extensive appeal measures in the legislation. Likewise, when contractors, subcontractors, consultants and suppliers do “carry the can” for such liability, they will look hard at the relief provisions in their contracts.
The disputes and delays that inevitably result can leave apartment owners and renters in limbo, despite the intent of the legislation to protect them.
Regulators need adequate resources
Another crucial “time will tell” aspect is whether the regulator will have enough resources to inspect buildings – and issue prohibition and rectification orders when needed – in a timely manner across the industry.
The legislation largely leaves it to the Department of Customer Service to appoint “authorised officers”. The minister has indicated these officers will be the building commissioner and his staff.
The commissioner was reported in February to be recruiting up to 60 construction professionals as “auditors” for a scheme that looks similar to what is now enshrined in legislation. They will need to move rapidly to have it ready for the extensive interventions that the legislation anticipates.
A game changer?
Ever since the Grenfell tragedy, politicians around the world have at least paid lip service to the aspiration that “occupants of buildings deserve to feel safe and secure within their walls”. In saying this to the NSW parliament last week, Anderson was able credibly to put forward the Residential Apartment Buildings Bill as a vital piece in the regulatory “puzzle” to achieve that goal.
The issues discussed here are likely to be just the tip of the iceberg as the industry absorbs the implications of the new law (and its forthcoming detail by way of regulations). But recent activity by NSW lawmakers suggests there is at last strong impetus to achieve meaningful and comprehensive reform.
Matthew Bell is a Senior Lecturer and Co-Director of Studies for Construction Law at the University of Melbourne.
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j.ballantyne1990-6AQqhLzZaK

New NSW building law could be a game changer for apartment safety: Matthew Bell

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GUEST OBSERVATION
A fire safety expert is warning of the risk of a catastrophic apartment fire in Australia because of flammable cladding and inadequate safety systems, the same causes as the London Grenfell Towers fire disaster.
In the wake of the fire in the Neo 200 apartment building in Melbourne, Professor Jonathan Barnett warns that a catastrophic fire event in Australia “is a matter of when, not if”.
“It’s scary,” says fire safety expert Barnett, Managing Director of Basic Expert Pty Ltd, who has a specialty in the analytical modelling of fire dynamics, smoke movement and occupant egress.
When the terrible images of the Grenfell Tower fire in London were beamed around the world in 2017, the horrifying loss of life caused shock and outrage.
The images also prompted questions about whether highly-flammable aluminium cladding used for the tower’s exterior was also being used by construction industries in other parts of the world, and kickstarted extensive rectification efforts to remove the cladding in Australia and other countries.
At issue is the use of flammable aluminium composite cladding, which is made from two skins of aluminium with a fibrous polyethylene material in the middle.
The added danger from inadequate fire safety system maintenance has increased the urgency of the need to replace the cladding in as many as 12,000 apartment buildings in Australia.
It’s an issue Westpac would like to see resolved. “We are aware of the issues around cladding and take these very seriously,” says Peter Spiller, National Head of Property Risk at Westpac, who has been working on the cladding problem in the wake of the Grenfell fire and spoke at a recent industry conference on the issue.
“Transparency and clarity will give home owners and residents greater peace of mind, so we are very supportive of the property sector, government, and banks working together to solve this issue as quickly as possible.”
Many safety issues
For Barnett, the extent of the danger in Australia became apparent when Basic Expert inspected the Neo 200 building in the wake of the February fire and discovered a large number of serious safety failings.
The fire in the 41-storey building in Melbourne’s Spencer Street most likely began when a resident threw a cigarette butt and it landed in a cardboard box on a lower balcony and then spread to that apartment’s cladding. Barnett notes that just 1.5 per cent of the Neo building’s upper level external walls are covered in cladding, but in the six minutes it took for the fire brigade to arrive and get upstairs, the fire had spread to five floors.
While Barnett describes that incident as “pretty minor”, the maintenance failings had rendered the building vulnerable to a much bigger fire.
The batteries in the fire indicator panel (FIP), which controls fire alarms through the building, had been flat for about four years and were leaking acid. There were numerous maintenance issues in the sprinkler pump room, which could have led to a compromised sprinkler and internal hydrant system.
Further, each apartment had a smoke detector, which was meant to be connected to the building’s central alarm system. But when the alarms were replaced after 10 years, most of the replacements were not compatible with the alarm system – meaning residents in these apartments wouldn’t receive alerts about a building fire, and a fire in their apartments wouldn’t trigger the central alarm system.
The overpressure switches – which ensure the water pressure passing through a building’s fire sprinklers doesn’t exceed 1000 kilopascals – had also failed and were allowing water pressure of 2000 kilopascals. This is important because the maximum pressure for a sprinkler is about 1500 kilopascals.
“They were lucky that they didn’t have a water hammer problem or something else when the fire brigade hooked up because they could have easily blown a fitting,” says Barnett, a Fellow of Engineers Australia and a Chartered Engineer who has also lectured at Victoria University and Melbourne University. “Because it was a combined hydro sprinkler system that would have meant, that they would have lost all the sprinklers.”
There were other problems.
“The lift and the emergency evacuation mode didn’t work properly at all. It went to the 13th floor and 37th floor instead of shuttling people out from the building,” says Barnett.
Of the 371 apartment doors, roughly 300 needed some sort of adjustment so that they would close and latch automatically in the case of a fire, which is vital for slowing the spread of the flames.
Barnett says it was lucky the building had just 1.5 per cent of cladding.
“If it had been a higher percentage, I think the system would have been asked to do more. Would it have managed? Maybe. A year from now, or two years from now, with that continued maintenance, would it have managed? The answer is no.”
A widespread problem
Victorian-based, Barnett inspects buildings around the country and estimates that around 80 per cent of Australia’s apartment buildings have some sort of problem with their fire safety systems. This is adding to the danger posed by the flammable cladding.
“If you look at Grenfell and you ask why did so many people die, they died because the apartment doors had been replaced over the years and didn’t close or latch and seal properly,” says Barnett. “They died because the doors to the stairs were problematic … basically because the other fire safety systems didn’t work. They didn’t die just because of the cladding.”
Both the NSW and Victorian governments have banned the use of aluminium composite panelling with a polyethylene core above 30 per cent.
However, that leaves a large number of buildings with the material, and the states have appointed taskforces to conduct audits of the number of affected buildings so they can be remediated as quickly as possible.
They have identified between 10,000 and 12,000 buildings around Australia that could have the flammable cladding – although the full extent of the problem isn’t clear because it is unknown how much, if any, of the cladding has been used in many of the buildings.
An indication of the scale of the problem comes from the Victorian Building Authority, which has inspected the 2000 buildings in the state with cladding and identified 275 of them as ‘high’ or ‘highest’ risk.
The authority is taking the lead with Cladding Rectification Agreements – three-way agreements between a funder, a local council and the owners of a building to fund rectification.
This article was first published on <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/https://westpaciq.westpac.com.au/Article/38795" target="_blank">Westpac IQ</a>.
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Fire risks in Australian buildings go beyond cladding: Jonathan Barnett

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The upmarket Ikon apartment block in Potts Point is the latest Sydney apartment block to find it has dangerous combustible cladding.
The building is spending $420,000 on rectification 15 years after its construction by Mirvac.
The report lodged seeking permission with Sydney City Council notes, based on the risk assessment and inspection by Red Fire Engineers, suggests certain sections of aluminium composite panelling must be removed and replaced with non-combustible panelling.
<img src="https://res.cloudinary.com/dz9xllyip/image/fetch/c_scale,w_580,q_auto:good/https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/po.images/2019/4/17/Ikon3.jpg" alt="">
"These remediation works are necessary as the currently installed panels present an undue risk of fire spread via the external façade, which do not meet the requirements of the BCA for attachments to an external wall."
Apartments prices recently peaked at $16 million.
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<a href="/news/potts-point-one-bedder-fetches-2-15-million">A one bedder was sold</a> at a record $2.15 million last July, although no settlement paperwork has yet to emerge at the LTO on the third floor apartment that was recently up for $850 a week rental.
The results from the testing presented in the report by CSIRO, indicate that the core materials in all ACPs would be deemed combustible if tested to AS 1530.1- 1994.
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"It is concluded that the ACP is combustible and present an undue risk of fire spread via the external façade, which does not meet the requirements of BCA Clause 2.4 in Specification C1.1 for attachments to an external wall achieving an FRL.
"In our opinion, The Ikon Apartments building presents a high risk of undue fire spread via the façade. This is because:
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The external façade system contains combustible components extending the full height of the building.
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A fire involving the façade could spread to multiple levels of the building through the windows and other openings.
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The cladding is installed near the exits, including wrapping around the south stair, therefore a fire has the potential to block exits."
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The report suggested, while low, there was a risk of a fire catastrophe.
<img src="https://res.cloudinary.com/dz9xllyip/image/fetch/c_scale,w_580,q_auto:good/https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/po.images/2019/4/17/Ikon5.jpg" alt="">
Ikon Apartments is an 18 storey Mirvac built high-rise developed in on the site on what once stood the Chevron.
There are 185 residential spaces with an indoor heated pool, spa, sauna and gym.
<img src="https://res.cloudinary.com/dz9xllyip/image/fetch/c_scale,w_580,q_auto:good/https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/po.images/2019/4/17/Ikon2.jpg" alt="">
Many of the open-plan residences have been curated by acclaimed interior designers and feature sun-catching outdoor areas, with balcony views.
Ikon has gone from being 60 percent investors to 80 percent owner-occupied.
The bulk of the risky cladding is on its southside, with the top four storeys having openings into bedrooms.
The cladding installed on the northeast corner of the building is in close proximity to an adjacent building, Rockwall Apartments.
<img src="https://res.cloudinary.com/dz9xllyip/image/fetch/c_scale,w_580,q_auto:good/https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/po.images/2019/4/17/Ikon6.jpg" alt="">
The risky cladding is even at its street front lobby entrance where the body corporate plan a more "subtle" than the exisiting bright red cladding currently in place.
It is understood Mirvac claim the Macleay Street building's cladding complied with relevant rules at the time it was built.
News.com.au reported last December that residents of The Quay in Sydney’s Haymarket were considering legal action in the Supreme Court of NSW against builder Parkview Constructions and Chinese developer Ausbao.
The Quay, a 282-unit, mixed-use development built on the site of the old poultry section of Paddy’s Market in Chinatown, was one of 435 identified as “potentially high-risk” by the NSW government’s Cladding Taskforce earlier last year.
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jchancellor-FAypfDUnLy

Fire catastrophe risk at Mirvac's Ikon, Potts Point apartment complex

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GUEST OBSERVATION
The <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/same-as-grenfell-tower-cladding-fears-as-fire-rips-through-melbourne-cbd-apartment-building-20190204-p50vgl" target="_blank">fire at the Neo200 building</a> on Spencer Street in the Melbourne CBD this week has eerie similarities to the <a href="http://theconversation.com/grenfell-a-year-on-heres-what-we-know-went-wrong-98112" target="_blank">Grenfell Tower disaster</a>. Fortunately, instead of 72 people dead as at Grenfell, only one person was hospitalised for smoke inhalation.
Nevertheless, the building industry has responded straight from the Grenfell song sheet. Rydon, the main contractor for the Grenfell Tower cladding, <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/meridian/update/2017-06-15/statement-from-rydon-after-public-inquiry-announcement/" target="_blank">said</a> the work: "… met all required building regulations – as well as fire regulation and Health &amp; Safety standards – and handover took place when the completion notice was issued by Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea building control."
Rydon chief executive Robert Bond <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/15/experts-warned-government-against-cladding-material-used-on-grenfell" target="_blank">said</a>: "I will do all I can to assist in this investigation in order to establish what caused this tragedy."
The Neo 200 architect, Hayball, <a href="https://architectureau.com/articles/cladding-back-in-the-spotlight-after-melbourne-apartment-tower-blaze/" target="_blank">stated</a>: "Neo 200 achieved certification and approval from the building certifier and relevant authorities at the time. We welcome the opportunity to support any investigation into the incident by authorities."
This appears to be the property sector’s version of “thoughts and prayers”. We’re very sorry, but there’s nothing we can do.
Sadly, this is far from the truth. We have known of the risk for years and the problem can be rectified.
Governments must act to ensure the cladding identified as a fire risk on hundreds of buildings is replaced. Further delay in fixing an identified threat to life is unacceptable.
Before the Grenfell and Neo200 fires, Melbourne had a cladding fire at the <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/docklands-owners-sue-for-24m-over-fire-as-date-to-fix-cladding-looms-20180909-p502pc" target="_blank">Lacrosse building</a> in 2014. This led to an <a href="https://www.vba.vic.gov.au/media/latest-news/article/2016/vba-releases-external-wall-cladding-audit-report" target="_blank">audit of external wall cladding</a> on buildings by the Victorian Building Authority.
Following the Grenfell fire, states conducted further audits. In October 2018, an <a href="/news">update</a> by the <a href="https://www.vba.vic.gov.au/cladding/victorian-cladding-taskforce" target="_blank">Victorian Cladding Taskforce</a> stated: "Our investigations found dangerous materials are widely used on buildings throughout Victoria, a finding that is consistent with inquiries carried out interstate and internationally."
We now know that hundreds of residential buildings are rated as either a moderate or high risk by the New South Wales and Victorian governments. Over 350 buildings in Melbourne alone are rated “high risk”. Neo200 was regarded as only a “moderate risk”.
Residential buildings are particularly vulnerable to the effects of a cladding fire because people can be asleep and windows are often left open. The amount of smoke generated by the recent Neo200 fire is frightening.
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Combustible cladding allowed the fire to spread rapidly up the Neo200 building.
In the UK, the central government has given local authorities the power to replace risky cladding. We should do the same here.
Governments should take rectification out of the hands of dithering strata committees and, if necessary, carry out the necessary work directly and recover the costs from the responsible parties.
How did we get to this point?
Polyethylene-cored aluminium sandwich panels – often referred to as aluminium composite panels (ACP), PE or PU panels – were <a href="https://alucobond.com/company#history" target="_blank">developed 50 years ago</a>, patented in 1971 and marketed as Alucobond. When the patent expired in 1991 other manufacturers entered the market, including products marketed as Reynobond (originally Reynolds Aluminium) and Alpolic (Mitsubishi Chemicals). Now, it is estimated over 200 manufacturers around the world produce ACP panels.
By the 1990s, ACP was gaining a level of acceptance in the Australasian construction market. This was aided by the introduction of performance requirements to replace a previous blanket ban on combustible materials being used on tall building facades. The timing of the relaxation of the Building Code of Australia and the introduction of ACP panels to the Australian market by multinational companies could be a coincidence.
By the end of the 1990s, there was growing evidence that the performance-based approach to facade fire protection was not working. Combustible cored sandwich panels were implicated as contributors to serious injuries and death. A notable example was a <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/https://www.ife.org.uk/Firefighter-Safety-Incidents/sun-valley-1993/34014" target="_blank">1993 fire in the Sun Valley food-processing factory in Hereford</a> in which two firefighters died. In 1997, the <a href="https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/home/burning-issues/181812.article" target="_blank">Museum of New Zealand (Te Papa) experienced a cladding fire</a> during construction.
The general and technical press, including architectural magazines with wide circulation, reported cladding fires in various types of materials, including ACP.
What can be done to reduce the risk?
Clearly, a facade fire has serious consequences. The bedrock of all modern fire regulations is that a fire in a tall building must be confined to a single storey. A fire spreading from one floor to the next completely undermines all the elements of protection and control that make egress routes and firefighting viable.
As we saw at Grenfell, a fire that spreads up the facade and involves nearly every storey in the building can’t be brought under control.
By 2000, there was widespread concern among fire professionals and some regulators that ACP was a bomb waiting to go off. A <a href="http://www.cookeonfire.com/pdfs/eurisolgreenreport.pdf" target="_blank">paper by Dr Gordon Cooke</a> clearly outlined the risks. It makes chilling reading in the light of the Grenfell disaster.
Luckily, most tall residential buildings in Australia with combustible ACP cladding have internal sprinkler systems – unlike Grenfell. We might also be able to buy some time by banning barbecues and smoking on balconies, but it is doubtful this will be 100% effective. Another possibility is to physically secure balcony doors shut, but many owners and tenants might strongly resist this draconian measure.
These measures still will not eliminate the <a href="https://www.propertyobserver.com.au/https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/victorian-government-refuses-to-publicly-identify/10780228" target="_blank">risk of arson highlighted by the Victorian government</a>.
As the Neo200 fire demonstrates, even a moderate risk is still quite risky. It is extraordinary that a fire allegedly lit by a single smouldering cigarette could spread so quickly across seven floors and generate so much potentially deadly smoke.
An urgent cladding replacement program certainly has its challenges. A campaign that involves working on several hundred buildings at once in Melbourne and Sydney might overload the industry.
Nevertheless, the situation has been created by a lack of action by governments. Only decisive government action can rectify it. No more “thoughts and prayers”, enquiries or investigations; just replace the cladding now.<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111186/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important;">
Geoff Hanmer, Adjunct Lecturer in Architecture, UNSW
This article is republished from <a href="http://theconversation.com" target="_blank">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cladding-fire-risks-have-been-known-for-years-lives-depend-on-acting-now-with-no-more-delays-111186" target="_blank">original article</a>.
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