Energy Cost

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GUEST OBSERVER
The <a href="https://theconversation.com/power-bills-can-fall-but-the-main-attention-must-be-on-affordability-accc-85734" target="_blank">preliminary report on energy prices</a> released last week by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) suggests that the consumer watchdog is concerned about almost every aspect of Australia’s electricity industry. It quotes customer groups who say electricity is the biggest issue in their surveys, and cites several case studies of outrageous price increases experienced by various customers.
The report is long on sympathy about the plight of Australia’s electricity users. But the true picture is even worse – in reality, the ACCC’s assessment of Australia’s energy prices compared to the rest of the world is absurdly rosy.
Australia has internationally high energy prices
The ACCC quotes studies from the Electricity Supply Association and the <a href="https://studylib.net/doc/6673393/category-analysis-rin---australian-energy-regulator" target="_blank">Australian Energy Markets Commission</a> (AEMC) to compare electricity prices in Australia with those in other OECD countries. But the ACCC’s comparison is based on two-year-old data, and badly underestimates the actual prices consumers are paying.
The AEMC’s analysis assumes all customers are on their retailer’s cheapest available offer. This is an obviously implausible assumption, and gives a favourable impression of the price that customers are paying.
As <a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-household-electricity-prices-may-be-25-higher-than-official-reports-84681" target="_blank">previously pointed out on The Conversation</a>, the Thwaites review – which looked at customers’ actual bills – found that in February 2017 Victorians were typically paying A35c per kilowatt hour (kWh) – 42% more than the AEMC’s estimate. What’s more, we know that Victoria’s electricity prices are lower on average than those in South Australia, Queensland and New South Wales, and hence below the Australian average.
A part of this 42% gap – around 15% – is explained by the latest price increases that are not included in the ACCC’s comparison. But this still leaves a 27% gap between what the AEMC assumes and the evidence of actual prices.
This begs the question: why did the ACCC not recognise the widely known flaw in the AEMC’s analysis?
<h2>The real problem is overbuilt network infrastructure</h2>
The report estimates that rising network charges account for more of the price increase than all other factors put together. There is no doubt that network charges are a real problem at least in parts of Australia, although their significance relative to retailers’ costs is contested territory.
But why would distributors build far more network infrastructure than they need? And why have government-owned distributors built far more infrastructure than private ones, despite having no more demand?
The answer to this perplexing question is to be found in part in Australia’s “competitive neutrality” policy. This is Orwellian doublespeak for an approach that is neither neutral nor competitive.
Under this policy, government-owned distributors are regulated as if they are privately financed. This means that when setting regulated prices, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) allows government distributors to charge their captive consumers for a return on their regulated assets, at the same level as if they were privately financed. That is despite the fact that private financing is much more expensive than government funding.
It’s no surprise that when offered a rate of return that far exceeds the actual cost of finance, government distributors have a powerful incentive to expand their infrastructure for a profit. This “gold-plating” incentive is a well-known in regulatory economics.
Regulators, the industry and their associations have explained higher spending on networks in a variety of ways: higher reliability standards; flawed rules; flawed forecasting of demand growth; and the need to make up for historic underinvestment.
But was there ever historic underinvestment? A 1995 article co-authored by the current AEMC chair concluded that distribution networks had been significantly overbuilt. That was more than two decades ago, government distributor regulated assets are at least three times bigger per customer now.
The chart below – based on data from the AER’s website – examines how the 12 large distributors that cover New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia spent their money on infrastructure between 2006 and 2013. This period covers the last five-year price controls established by the state regulators, and the first control established by the AER. It was during this time that expenditure ballooned. The monetary amounts in this chart are normalised by the number of customers per distributor.
<img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/191134/original/file-20171019-1072-1b07x7v.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt="">
 Distributor spending on infrastructure between 2006 and 2013. Author provided
The first five distributors from left to right (and Aurora) were owned by state governments and the others are privately owned. A clear pattern emerges: the government distributors typically built much more infrastructure than the private distributors. And the government distributors focused their spending on substations, which are much easier to build (or expand or replace) than new distribution lines or cables.
We also know that the distributors’ spending on substations far outstripped the increases in the peak demand on their networks. The figure below compares the change in the government and private distributors’ substation capacity (the blue bars) with demand (the red bars) over the period that most of the expenditure occurred. Again, the amounts have been normalised by number of customers.
<img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/191133/original/file-20171019-1075-d1dvow.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip" alt="">
Substation capacity versus peak demand between 2006 and 2013. Author provided
The gap in spending between government and private distributors is stark. It is also obvious that in all cases, but particularly for the government distributors, the expansion of substation capacity greatly exceeded demand growth - which hardly changed over this period (and is even lower now, per connection).
To put it in more tangible terms, as an average across the industry, peak demand between 2006 to 2013 increased by the equivalent of the power used by one old-fashioned incandescent light bulb, per customer. But government distributors expanded their substation capacity by more than one 100 light bulbs, per customer. The private distributors did relatively better, but still increased the capacity of their substations by the equivalent of about 30 light bulbs per customer.
My PhD thesis included econometric analysis that shows government ownership in Australia is associated with regulated asset values that are 56% higher than private distributors, and regulated revenues that are 24% higher, leaving all other factors the same.
To some, this evidence supports a “government bad, private good” conclusion. Indeed it was this line of argument that the Baird government in New South Wales used to justify its partial privatisation of two network service providers.
But in international comparisons of government and private distributors in the United States, Europe and New Zealand, no such stark differences are to be found. The huge disparity between government and private distributors is a peculiarly Australian phenomenon.
<h2>How we got here</h2>
This Australian exception originates in chronic policy and regulatory failure. As far back as 2011, the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) heard a proposal that government distributors should earn a return closer to their actual cost of financing – a suggestion that would have reduced prices significantly and removed the incentive to gold plate.
In response, the AEMC said the regulations were consistent with the “competitive neutrality” policy. But this is not true: in the policy’s own words, it was designed to stop government businesses from crowding out competitors. Distributors are protected monopolies; they do not have competitors.
The AEMC also argued, somewhat bizarrely, that it was good economics for a regulator to assume that government distributors are privately financed.
This represents the triumph of an idealistic “normative” regulatory model in which regulators act on the basis of how the regulated entity should behave rather than how they actually behave.
But it would wrong to blame the AEMC alone for this failure. All of Australia’s key institutions and governments have agreed that government distributors should be regulated as if they are privately financed. For governments that own their distributors, this has been a wonderfully profitable fiction.
Therein lies much of the explanation for what is effectively, if I may call a spade a spade, a racket.
It is an indictment of Australia’s polity and so many of its economists that the 2011 Garnaut Climate Change Review stands alone, in a library of reviews, as stating this problem clearly. In fact, if you review last week’s report from the ACCC, you will not find a single distinction between the impact of government and private distributors.
And if you thought this was yesterday’s war, you would be wrong. Despite the mass of evidence, our regulators persist in the fiction that ownership and regulation should be independent of one another.
It is difficult not to lapse into despair about Australia’s energy policy morass. Despite the valiant attempts by many, a deeply entrenched culture of half-truths, vested interests, ideology and wishful thinking still characterises all too much of what emanates from the political and administrative leadership of this industry.
Some energy consumers – Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull among them – will buy their way out of this problem through solar panels and batteries. But the poorest households and many business customers will increasingly be left carrying the can.
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86045/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1">Australians are angry about electricity. Not unreasonably.
Bruce Mountain is director of carbon and energy markets at Victoria University.
This article was originally published on <a href="https://theconversation.com" target="_blank">The Conversation</a>. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/energy-prices-are-high-because-consumers-are-paying-for-useless-profit-boosting-infrastructure-86045" target="_blank">original article</a>.
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j.ballantyne1990-6AQqhLzZaK

Energy prices are high because consumers are paying for useless, profit-boosting infrastructure: Bruce Mountain

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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.edu.au/content/63597/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1">
GUEST OBSERVER
The energy sector is dealing with a complex mix of relationships between consumer trends, global commodity markets, and state, federal and industry regulation.
Because large established companies in electricity generation and distribution and coal and natural gas export have a lot of influence in this process, Australian energy regulations reflect more traditional energy provision rather than global trends where renewable energy is becoming more prevalent.
State governments are currently coming to terms with the regulatory changes needed to accommodate public support for disruptive technology. One example is the ongoing adoption of ride-sharing company Uber. However this same pragmatism needs to be reflected in preparations for the provision and consumption of energy in Australia. The energy companies that are prepared for this disruption will survive and flourish, while those that cling to traditional structures will struggle.
<div id="responsive-iframe-0">Evidence of disruption</div>
Globally energy companies are already showing signs of being affected by the looming disruption. Coal miners have been subjected to multiple forces over the last decade, but the changing landscape associated with new forms of energy, is a strong influencer of their performance. Coal companies in the US are facing dwindling share prices or bankruptcy like Peabody Energy and Arch Coal.
Tesla’s share price, which increased from US$28.52 in August 2012 to US$220 in August 2016, is more than double that of more traditional vehicle company Toyota. Toyota has experienced moderate growth from US$79.62 in August 2012. With electric vehicles forcing themselves into the motor vehicle market, technological disruptors like Tesla are seen as more likely to succeed than traditional motor vehicle companies like Ford.
West Texas Intermediate, a benchmark international oil price, declined from US$133 a barrel in July 2008 to US$45 a barrel in July 2016. This followed a slowdown in global growth after the global financial crisis and increased production of oil in Saudi Arabia, which some claim is to gain market share. Coal prices for export from Australia have fallen from A$180 a tonne in July 2008 to A$63 a tonne in July 2016 as China’s voracious appetite for coal has declined.
International natural gas prices have also declined because in Europe the natural gas price has been referenced to the oil price. Separate to this, the US price of natural gas declined as a result of new drilling technologies which released huge quantities of natural gas onto the US market, dragging down the price.
Many of these global trends are apparent in Australia too. Coal export prices have caused concerns for existing companies to the extent that new mine development has been shelved since 2008. Coal mine profits have dwindled and job losses abound.
Ambitious plans for coal seam and natural gas extraction for export to Asian markets have been curtailed with some experts predicting still further price declines in response to oversupply.
While there have been recent small upticks in prices, the trend for Australian primary energy company share prices since early 2014 has been downwards.
<h2>Challenges facing the Australian electricity generation sector</h2>
The electricity sector in Australia is facing multiple challenges. Electricity consumption has declined since 2009 and is forecast to increase only slightly by 2035/6. The closing of large energy users like the Kurri Kurri aluminium smelter and the Clyde Oil refinery, and a shift by residential consumers to the consumption of electricity from solar panels have contributed to this trend.
This is coupled with increasing supply of energy from low marginal cost wind power which, if the Australian National Energy Market is working as designed, reduces the spot price for electricity.
Many electricity generators have launched or acquired retail businesses to market directly to customers. AGL and Origin are the two largest of these “gentailers”, with a combined 56% of the small customer market in the eastern states. However, there is potential for disruption to this existing industry model. 1.57 million households now have solar panels on their roofs, and residential batteries are expected to increase consumer control of residential electricity.
Startups like Sunverge, Reposit and Powerledger are looking to connect households with spare energy to households buying spare energy. Mojo Power is offering customers fixed price packages that are more reminiscent of mobile phone offers than electricity. At this stage it is unclear whether the National Electricity Market will play a part in, or hinder, these new business models.
A few retail companies, like Red, Lumo, Powershop and Infinite spruik their renewable energy credentials. Renewable energy is viewed very favourably by the public.
Recent polling suggests that 71% of respondents would favour a government that facilitated greater support for solar panels and batteries. Energy giant AGL has a larger renewable energy portfolio than Origin making it slightly more attractive to consumers with environmental concerns, but it is exposed to the risk of owning a large coal generation fleet.
Infigen is the only renewable, publicly listed company. Infigen faced torrid times during the multiple back-to-back reviews of the Renewable Energy Target, but since the target has been set at 33GWh, Infigen’s share price has been recovering.
Of note, is the share prices of domestic energy companies AGL and Origin who are both in the business of generating and retailing electricity and previously were both engaged in the development of coal seam gas. Origin has continued its coal seam gas investment while AGL exited the market. AGL has instead focused more on diversifying its electricity generation portfolio. Part of this strategy has involved formulating innovative plans for virtual power stations of consolidated rooftop solar panels and residential batteries.
Origin’s foray into the export of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) has not been good for its share price. Concern over debt related to the investment in LNG and exposure to declining LNG prices has worried investors.
<h2>Electricity distribution also faces multiple challenges</h2>
Electricity distribution companies in Australia are regulated monopolies. Distribution companies in NSW and QLD have been government owned and as a result of hefty investment plans, large electricity price rises were passed through to customers after 2009. This was at the same time as environmental charges were being included in electricity tariffs.
Customers were angered by the rise in electricity prices, but the NSW and QLD governments have enjoyed the profits that have flowed back into state coffers.
The NSW government is now seeking to sell a large share of its distribution businesses, although the most promising buyers have been knocked back by the federal government due to security concerns. With the popularity of solar panels and the expectation about the benefits of battery storage to meet demand after sundown, investors buying into the electricity distribution sector will be facing disruption.
Origin and AGL have gambled on different strategies to face a future with carbon constraints and technological disruption. Origin has bet on natural gas being a transition fuel to a cleaner energy future, while AGL is betting on electricity from renewable sources with batteries as the preferred path.
Energy distribution companies need to wrestle with the technological disruption that is looming from decentralised, distributed generation from solar panels, batteries and peer-to-peer energy transactions. Coal miners should seriously consider diversification to face a carbon-constrained future. The energy sector is in a state of transition; profits and share prices may be volatile for a few years to come. It would be advantageous if regulation did not get in the way of the shifts already evident.
Lynette Molyneaux is researcher, Energy Economics and Management Group, Global Change Institute, The University of Queensland and author for The Conversation. She can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/lynette-molyneaux-9433" target="_blank">here</a>.
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