Economics

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China’s policy makers met at the National People’s Congress in early March, announcing an economic growth target range of 6.5-7 percent. 
In addition, they released a target growth rate for total social financing of ‘around 13 percent’ – which would result in a further deterioration of debt-to-GDP.
As noted in this month’s China Economic Update, a broader estimate of China’s debt puts this figure at around 308% of GDP – a level comparable to many advanced economies and particularly high for a still developing country. Chinese authorities are now facing a debt dilemma – they can no longer allow debt to grow unchecked, however controlling debt growth would mean accepting a slower rate of economic growth. At least for 2016, they appear content to allow the former to happen.
Industrial production growth slowed to a seven year low in January-February, while fixed asset investment accelerated slightly, on the back of stronger investment in real estate. New construction starts were stronger over this period, but it is too early to know if this is a trend that can be sustained.
Retail sales were a little softer – with real retail sales growth likely dipping below 10 percent yoy, slightly weaker than the levels recorded across most of 2015 but still robust. 
At the end of February, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) cut the Required Reserve Ratio for the fifth time in a year – down to 17 percent for large institutions – potentially adding RMB 690 billion in liquidity to financial markets. As we have previously noted, these policy changes are not necessarily stimulatory, as RRR cuts have been necessary to maintain liquidity in the finance sector, given the capital outflow in recent years.
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China’s policy makers met at the National People’s Congress in early March, releasing a range of targets for key economic indicators. The most closely watched is the economic growth target, which was slightly reduced for 2016 – to a range of 6.5 percent to 7.0 percent – compared with last year’s ‘around 7.0 percent’. 
Our forecast for growth is unchanged at 6.7 percent in 2016 and 6.5 percent in 2017, although we consider the risks to be weighted to the downside. 
Authorities also set a target for growth in total social financing, at around 13 percent for 2016 – which would mean a further deterioration in the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio. 
As noted in this month’s China Economic Update, a broader estimate of China’s debt puts this figure at around 308 percent of GDP – a level comparable to many advanced economies and particularly high for a still developing country. 
Under the newly commenced 13th Five Year Plan, also released at the National People’s Congress, China is targeting an average rate of growth of 6.5 percent in the period to 2020 – which would result in a doubling of GDP over 2010 levels. 
Chinese policy makers are facing a significant dilemma regarding the country’s debt. They can no longer afford to allow debt to grow unchecked – as this would increase the likelihood of a major financial crisis and the potential for a hard landing. On the other side, real economic growth is unlikely to be sustainable at the five year target without stronger growth in debt – bringing down the ratio would mean tolerating a considerably lower potential rate for economic growth (something that policy makers are unlikely to tolerate). 
China’s industrial production slowed across January and February – down to 5.4 percent yoy (compared with 5.9 percent in December 2014). This rate of growth was below expectations and the slowest rate of growth since the same period in 2009. 
Key heavy industrial sectors remained weak – with crude steel output falling by 5.7 percent yoy, cement production down 8.2 percent yoy – reflecting weakness in the construction sector, while the motor vehicle sector recorded growth of 5.3 percent yoy. Electricity generation was marginally stronger – up 0.3 percent yoy. 
•China’s industrial surveys have remained negative in early 2016, with the official NBS survey falling to 49.0 points in February (from 49.4 points previously), the weakest level since January 2009. In contrast, the Caixin Markit PMI also fell, down to 48.0 points (from 48.4 in January), but this measure is less negative than late 2015. 
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Fixed asset investment recorded an acceleration in early 2016, with growth at 10.2 percent yoy across January and February, up from 8.2 percent yoy in December. It is worth noting that this was around the rate of growth recorded in November 2015, which was well below the trend levels of recent years. 
Investment in the manufacturing sector has continued to slow – reflecting tough industrial conditions and excess production capacity – down to 6.7 percent yoy (on a three month moving average basis), compared with 7.6 percent in December. In contrast, there has been a slight improvement in real estate investment, recording growth of 1.7 percent yoy (3mma) in February, up from -3.3 percent in December. Combined, these two sectors accounted for almost 56 percent of total investment in 2015. 
In contrast, strong investment growth has been sustained in water conservation and environmental management (27 percent yoy across January-February) and public utilities (19 percent yoy) – with these sectors comprising around 15 percent of the total in 2015. 
Residential construction activity was stronger in January-February, however it is too soon to know whether this is a trend that can be sustained. New construction starts were up around 9.7 percent yoy over this period, and up 1.5 percent yoy on our preferred three month moving average basis (reflecting very weak growth in late 2015). 
House price trends have improved in recent months, however the majority of gains have been in China’s tier 1 cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou) – where prices rose by 17% yoy. In contrast, tier 2 cities rose by just 0.3% yoy and tier 3 and below by 1.1% yoy. A more sustained recovery outside tier 1 cities may be required to support sustained stronger construction activity. 
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China’s trade activity pulled back sharply over the first two months of the year, with substantial falls in both imports and exports – both from the levels of late 2015 and from levels a year ago. China’s trade surplus only narrowed marginally – averaging US$47.9 billion a month across January and February (compared with US$59.4 billion in December 2015).
Across January and February, China’s imports totalled US$207.5 billion, a year on year fall of 17%. In part, this reflects the continued falls in commodity prices, with the RBA Index of Commodity Prices falling by almost 25% yoy in the first two months of the year.
In contrast, the volume of imports has declined less significantly, down by only around 2.8% in 2015, and around 6.8% in January (although the earlier timing of Chinese new year may have distorted the latter result).
In terms of major commodities, there were noticeable increases in imports of copper (up 23% yoy in January-February), crude oil (up 9.3% yoy) and iron ore (up 6.3% yoy). In contrast, the declining trend for coal continued, down by 10% yoy over the first two months.
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China’s exports totalled US$303.3 billion across January and February, a fall of 18% yoy. China’s exporters remain relatively negative, with the new export orders measure in the NBS PMI survey at 47.4 points in February (albeit improved from 46.9 points in January).
The key driver of the fall in export values over the first two months was a decline in exports to Asia – which fell by over 18 percent yoy, to US$90 billion. Exports to Europe and the United States fell less significantly – with both down by around 16 percent yoy.
Exports to Hong Kong declined less sharply than other markets – down by around 13 percent yoy across January and February. In contrast, non-Hong Kong Asia saw declines of almost 22 percent yoy – led by falling export values to Malaysia, South Korea and Vietnam.
Trade data between China and Hong Kong continues to have considerable distortions, in part due to false invoicing used to hide unapproved capital flows – providing considerable uncertainty around the true level of trade.
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At the end of February, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) cut the Required Reserve Ratio for the fifth time in a year – down to 17 percent for large institutions – potentially adding RMB 690 billion in liquidity to financial markets. As we have previously noted, these policy changes are not necessarily stimulatory, as RRR cuts have been necessary to maintain liquidity in the finance sector, given the capital outflow in recent years. 
We continue to expect two cuts to interest rates in early 2016 – bringing the benchmark one year lending rate to 3.85 percent by mid-year. Similarly further cuts to the Required Reserve Ratio are likely to maintain liquidity in the finance sector, with capital outflows likely to continue in the short term. 
After a sharp increase in January (ahead of Chinese new year), new credit slowed significantly in February. Over the two month period, aggregate financing totalled RMB 4.2 trillion, an increase of 23 percent yoy. 
Bank loans recorded slightly slower growth, 19 percent yoy, to total RMB 3.1 trillion. Efforts to tightened regulation around the shadow banking sector has seen a strong increase in bank loans across the past two years. 
The key driver of other credit was corporate bonds, with net issuance totalling RMB 541 billion in January and February, an increase of 110 percent. 
Key components of the shadow banking sector largely cancelled each other out – with growth in trust and entrusted loans (at 111 percent yoy) offset by a sharp fall in banker acceptances (-275 percent yoy). 
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Alan Oster is group chief economist, National Australia Bank, and can be contacted <a href="https://business.nab.com.au/author/alan-oster/" target="_blank">here</a>.
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China's economy at a glance: NAB's Alan Oster

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GUEST OBSERVER
Last Friday, the world’s central bankers and some high profile economics professors will gather in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for the annual Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium.
The Symposium, which is hosted by the Kansas City Federal Reserve, began in 1978. It does allow for discussions, information exchange, and time to reflect on the key issues bearing on monetary policy. But it’s not like the US Fed Chair Janet Yellen can’t talk to the European Central Bank (ECB) president whenever she wants – and vice versa.
More importantly, it provides a platform for Yellen and ECB President Mario Draghi to send very public messages about the future path of monetary policy in their respective jurisdictions.
The theme this year is “Fostering a Dynamic Global Economy”. That sounds like a good thing to have – better than an “undynamic one” – but don’t expect a lot of headline-grabbing comments from Yellen or Draghi.
All the data, and all the recent public statements by Yellen and Draghi, point to things basically going as planned. Cross your fingers. Hold your breath. Pray. Whatever works for you.
Draghi is a very smart guy, but he made a complete unforced error in a speech in June. At a banking conference in Portugal he offered: “All signs now point to a strengthening and broadening recovery in the euro area.”
Markets sure paid attention to those remarks. Bond yields rose, as did the Euro, as investors figured Draghi was going to start unwinding his quantitative easing policy. That led to a cast of ECB members having to tell markets that QE was here to stay for now.
Draghi seems to have learned his lesson. On Wednesday in Lindau, Germany he said: “While forward guidance (a tool used by central banks to influence, with their own forecasts, market expectations) is a useful instrument, recent research has highlighted that its effectiveness can be improved if combined with other non-standard monetary policies.”
Translation: no end to QE for now.
We can expect him to say something equivalently uninformative in Jackson Hole (which is actually a compliment to a central banker).
In the US, the Fed has been slowly, deliberately, and carefully tightening monetary policy in response to low unemployment and improved GDP growth. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), unemployment now stands at 4.3% nationally. Wage growth is still on the low side with average hourly earnings (for private, nonfarm payrolls) at US$26.36, up by 2.5% year-on-year to July. But compare that to Australia’s 1.8% wages growth for private-sector workers.
The main issue for the Fed is that inflation remains subdued. Two weeks ago the US Labor Department released figures showing the CPI was up 0.1% in July, after being unchanged in June. Year-on-year the CPI stood at 1.7%, still below the 2% Fed target.
This is Big Issue One for the Fed. Why is inflation so stubbornly low? Is it really because stuff is cheap on Amazon? It’s fair to say that the Fed’s (and others’) macroeconomic models are having a hard time explaining this fact.
But don’t expect Yellen to wade into the inflation-puzzle waters this week. That’s the sort of thing best done in the post-summer period – the US academic new year. My guess is that Yellen will start addressing that topic publicly some time before Thanksgiving, if she decides to do so at all.
There is, however, always the possibility for some fireworks at Jackson Hole. Not from Yellen or Draghi, but one of the academic speakers.
<h2>Rocking the boat</h2>
At Jackson Hole in 2005 University of Chicago Booth School of Business professor Raghuram Rajan gave a speech that was not popular with then-Fed-Chair Alan Greenspan, but turned out to be prescient.
The title of the paper he based it on was “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” And he answered it in the affirmative. The reaction from many in the room at the time was that Professor Rajan was some kind of financial Luddite. Perhaps he also thought the wheel was a bad invention?
The fact that he was, well, right, is interesting and important, but beside the point for the purposes of this column. The real question is what the equivalent bomb-throwing speech from a participant might be this time.
Hard to say, but it might be to do with 2% GDP growth being the new normal, and what that means for long term monetary policy. This has been discussed by many people, such as former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, so it might not be all that new. But it could be made forcefully at the very large megaphone that Jackson Hole provides.
Look for a speech from a noted academic suggesting that inflation targeting should be abandoned; perhaps replaced with targeting of nominal GDP growth.
Such a speech wouldn’t be super new, or very surprising. But it might ruffle some feathers. The Fed has a plan and they’re sticking to it. This is practical macro. I suspect they are not in the mood for an academic seminar.
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/richard-holden-118107" target="_blank">Richard Holden</a> is a Professor of Economics and PLuS Alliance Fellow at UNSW and author for <a href="https://theconversation.com/au" target="_blank">The Conversation</a>.
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Don’t expect much from the central bankers at Jackson Hole: Richard Holden

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GUEST OBSERVER
The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and the Reserve Bank (RBA) are locked into a strange game of tweaking with economic levers to try and reduce the risk of a rapidly growing property market.
But past cycles of rate rises and rules to try and curb lending to investors show the effectiveness of these measures is running out.
It also underscores the problems arising from a government unwilling to tackle the problem at source – the perverse incentives in the tax system. 
Looking back to December 2014, the RBA voiced its mounting concerns about the rapid growth in lending to property investors and the steep increases in property prices it was fuelling. But rather than address these concerns by raising interest rates, as the RBA had done in somewhat similar circumstances in the early 2000s, it was instead left to the banking system regulator APRA to tackle this by writing a letter to banks and other mortgage lenders about the need for more cautious mortgage lending practices.
This letter laid down new rules capping the annual growth in lending to investors at a benchmark of 10%. APRA also set stricter criteria for determining whether borrowers could repay their loans if interest rates were to change. 
This warning from the regulator had its desired effect. The share of new housing loans made to investors fell from over 40% during the 2014-15 financial year to less than 30% by the December quarter of 2015.
And this in turn saw the annual growth rate of loans to property investors slow from a peak of 10.8% in the June quarter of 2015 to less than 8% by the end of 2015. It fell again to less than 5% by the September quarter of last year. 
The banks also fell into line with the new rules, cutting back on other more risky types of lending, such as interest-only loans, and loans with initial loan-to-valuation ratios in excess of 90%.
The RBA was especially pleased with these developments, thinking that the risk was easing. So when it met again in May last year, the RBA Board was persuaded to cut the cash rate to a new record low of 1.75%,in response to a much-lower-than-expected inflation result for the March quarter. 
The RBA still seemed content at its August 2016 meeting, seeing the easing conditions in the housing market as being consistent with APRA tightening the lending standard screws. It decided on another cut in the cash rate, to 1.5%.
But now investors have come back into the property market with a vengeance. These two reductions in interest rates have in effect overwhelmed the tightening in lending standards enforced by APRA during the first half of 2015.
This resurgence in lending to property investors has pushed up property prices once again, especially in Sydney and Melbourne. Dwelling values rose by 18.4% in Sydney and 13.1% Melbourne respectively, over the year to February.
The share of new loans going to investors has picked up from less than 30% in the December quarter 2015, to over 35% in the December quarter 2016, according to APRA statistics. This is from less than 44% of new housing finance commitments (excluding refinancings) in November 2015 to more than 50% in January 2017 according to ABS housing finance statistics. 
The annual growth rate of loans outstanding to housing investors, as published by the RBA, has accelerated from 4.6% last August to 6.7% in February this year: over the last four months, lending to property investors has risen at an annualised rate of 8.0%. 
Now the RBA is back to being concerned about a build up of risks associated with the housing market. 
The RBA’s Assistant Governor (Financial System), Michele Bullock, acknowledges that although APRA’s 2015 actions “did address some of the risks” that had been mounting during 2014, “the initial effects on credit…may fade over time”. She added that APRA and the RBA “are prepared to do more if needed”. But since the RBA clearly has no appetite to reverse last year’s rate cuts any time soon, the only feasible option in the short term option is for APRA to do something about the Sydney and Melbourne markets. 
So APRA has today take another another bite at the cherry, requiring banks to restrict new interest-only lending to 30% of all new loans (a lower proportion than at any time since early 2009) and to ensure that growth in lending to investors is “comfortably below” the 10% cap.
What all of this highlights is the limited effectiveness of so-called “macro-prudential” measures in countering the very strong incentives to invest in residential property. These incentives are created by the combination of record low interest rates and the unusually generous treatment which the Australian taxation system gives to the costs of and returns from debt-funded property investment. 
While some commentators have urged the Reserve Bank to lift interest rates in order to dampen the latest surge in borrowing to invest in residential property, this seems unlikely. The RBA continues to expect inflation to remain below its 2-3% target range until at least the middle of next year, and unemployment to remain closer to 6% than to 5%.
It would be far better if the federal government were to tackle the problem at source. He could do this either by limiting the scope for negative gearing or reducing the capital gains tax discount, as Malcolm Turnbull once advocated (in a 2005 paper co-authored with the ANU’s Jeromey Temple). Even the Property Council of Australia has conceded should be lowered to 40%, and denied altogether on investments held for less than two years. 
However, given the government’s unwillingness to consider such measures, it seems more likely that APRA may have to become even more prescriptive with its lending criteria. And, as we have seen, in the current interest rate environment that is merely a bandaid solution – and bandaids eventually wear off.
Saul Eslake is vice-chancellor’s Fellow, University of Tasmania and author for The Conversation. He can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/saul-eslake-665" target="_blank">here</a>.
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The APRA bandaid for the housing market is wearing off: Saul Eslake

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GUEST OBSERVER
When the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) recently released its recommendations on how the government should balance the budget, it prefaced it with the statement “No economic problem in Australia is graver than the persistence of large budget deficits”. But precisely the opposite is true.
To understand why, it’s necessary to explain the economic work of David Alan Aschauer. Work that appears to have been ignored in the current discussion about budget deficits.
Aschauer investigated the effects of government spending on infrastructure in increasing of the rate of return on private investment and hence on the volume of investment in the private sector. His work has been accepted by an extremely wide range of economists. It is not new. His most-quoted article was published in 1989.
Moreover, Aschauer is a neoclassical economist; that is he belongs to what is currently the dominant school of economics. Since 1989 there have been many articles published by Aschauer and his followers.
Aschauer himself summed up his work in the following quote:
“On neoclassical grounds expansions of public investment spending should have a larger stimulative effect on private output than equal-sized increases in private consumption expenditure. Specifically, public investment is argued to induce an increase in the rate of return to private capital and, thereby, to stimulate private investment expenditure.
The empirical analysis indicates that movements in public investment bring forth movements in private-sector output which are four to seven times as large as the public sector outlays.”
Of course, there can be, and have been, arguments about the size of the effects that Aschauer estimated in his empirical work. The general tenor of these is that the figure is more likely to be closer to the lower end of Aschauer’s range than the top.
But when researchers at UNSW made estimates for Australia, they arrived at a figure they described as “very similar to Aschauer’s (1989) findings for the United States". They concluded that “public capital plays an important role in private production, a role which may often be overlooked”.
This provided evidence, they believed, of the positive relationship between public capital and productivity in the private sector in Australia in the 30 years before they wrote their article.
Both Aschauer and the Australian researchers Glenn Otto and Graham Voss used aggregate data – data for the whole public capital sector and for productivity in the private sector as a whole.
Their striking and important results do not remove the need for governments to pick public investment projects that are more likely to increase private sector productivity. The models they and Aschauer have used are too simple to give convincing answers to the question, which requires the use of much more sophisticated models. However, they do cast doubts on the likelihood of politically motivated public investment projects contributing anything to long-term growth in Australia. And they were not writing in an election year.
Current discussions about budget deficits largely ignore the work of Aschauer and are much poorer as a result.
If some attention had been paid to this work the gloom and doom of CEDA’s recent report would have been greatly reduced.
John Nevile is visiting emeritus professor, UNSW Australia and author for The Conversation. He can be contacted <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/john-nevile-139716" target="_blank">here</a>.
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Balancing the budget mantra overlooks benefits of infrastructure spending

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EXPERT OBSERVER 

The Reserve Bank Board’s minutes for its December meeting emphasised that the Board is committed to substantial policy support for a considerable period.

The Minutes note that “Substantial policy support would therefore be required for a considerable period”.

Despite recent encouraging economic developments around the distribution of vaccines in both the US and UK and what the minutes refer to as “the recovery in the labour market was more advanced than expected” there remains significant caution with respect to the Board’s confidence in the recovery –“the unemployment rate had ticked up in recent months and broader measures of labour underutilisation remained high” – “there was still a significant amount of spare capacity in the labour market and this would remain a key policy challenge for some time”.

Overall, the sentiment from the Board is broadly unchanged, “the recovery was still expected to be uneven and protracted”.

A second outstanding theme in the minutes is the view on the housing market. The domestic housing market was described as “improving but uneven” and it was pointed out that “national housing prices had increased only a little since the outbreak of the pandemic”.

The decline in overseas migration had impacted the rental housing market with rents falling and “rental vacancy rates in inner city Sydney and Melbourne around their highest levels in many years”. There is some speculation that the authorities may see the need to slow the housing market in 2021 with some form of macro prudential policies.

Our view is that these record low rates will eventually move house prices to levels that will concern the authorities (particularly if confidence returns and the significant lift in new lending is not offset by rising repayments resulting in elevated levels of household debt) but that will be a story for 2023.

Conclusion

Yesterday we released our forecasts for the RBA’s approach to Quantitative Easing.

We expect that the current $100 billion program will be extended into a second $100 billion program before being reduced to two consecutive $50 billion programs that will see the policy covering both 2021 and 2022.

In fact, this coverage will fall a little short of the end 2022 date.

The current program which began on November 5 is described by the RBA as “approximately six months” would expire in late April/early May 2021.

We expect that will be immediately replaced by a second program of equal size and length taking the program to late October/early November 2021.

That program is expected to be replaced by a smaller, $50 billion, program of “approximately six months” to Late April/early May 2022; and finally, a fourth program to late October/early November 2022.

Two years of QE is unlikely to be currently priced into the curve but the approach set out in the December Minutes – “substantial policy support; considerable period”; “protracted recovery” all indicate that the RBA is certainly contemplating further QE.

In particular we are likely to hear more early in the new year as indicated by the Minutes, “Members agreed to keep the size of the bond purchase program under review”.
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Yesterday we forecast that the RBA Board would extend the current $100 billion QE program with a second $100 billion program (start date corrected to early May from June, 2021). The December Minutes give clear support for this view

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RBA Minutes support Westpac's QE views: Bill Evans

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GUEST OBSERVATION
Business conditions in Australia have been strong enough to see a surge in company tax revenue that led Treasurer Scott Morrison to outline cuts to personal income taxes over the next seven years in Tuesday’s federal budget.
Those same robust business conditions were reflected in the National Australia Bank Business Conditions Index which was up sharply in April to 21 points (up 6 points from the previous month). This puts it at the highest level in twenty years.
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NAB chief economist Alan Oster said of the figures:
"The record high in the April survey simply reinforces what has been evident since the middle of last year, that business activity in Australia is robust…I see the business survey as indicative as why the government appears to be rolling in corporate tax revenue."
In the United States, the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey in March showed a surge of job openings - up 472,000 to 6.55 million. That was the highest reading on record. It also showed more workers voluntarily leaving jobs. This is generally regarded as strong sign of worker confidence and is indicative of looming wage inflation.
The US Producer Price Index rose just 0.1% in April according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, much lower than estimates of 0.3%, the level of growth in March. This put the index up 2.6% over the last 12 months, down from 3.0%.
This eased concerns about rising inflation that have been a major focus of discussions about interest rates at the Federal Open Market Committee at recent meetings. That could make the Fed less likely to raise rates quickly, though the tightening path still seems likely.
All eyes will be on the May 10, inflation statistics release to see if there is less heat than the Fed has seemed to fear, especially with unemployment now running at 3.9%.
Adding to this, China’s Producer Price Index dropped by 0.2% from February, putting the annual rate at 3.1%, the weakest level since October 2016.
Economists were looking for an annual increase of 3.2%, down from 3.7% in February. Because China is such a significant global exporter, the lower Producer Price Index should ease any inflationary pressures in other countries. In other words, China is exporting less inflation.
China’s Consumer Price Index actually fell 1.1% last month, putting the annual rate at positive 2.1%. Last month’s figures in part reflect the timing of Chinese New Year, so one shouldn’t read too much into them. On the other hand, any softening of the Chinese economy is a big deal for Australian exporters and our economy generally.
The coming months overseas will be very revealing. We will get a better handle on whether there are genuine inflationary pressures in the US - or whether perhaps there is a new normal. That will affect short-term interest rates, but also says something about where those rates are likely to move back to in the cycle.
We will also get a better fix on the Chinese economy, at least in terms of growth numbers. What still remains opaque is the health of China’s financial sector. That remains a significant concern.
Both the US and China will factor heavily into two key things in Australia. The first is, of course, the RBA’s interest rate decisions later this year. The second is the key number in the federal budget - the 3.0% real GDP growth assumption that underpins the forecast return to surplus and the rationale for the personal income tax plan.
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96357/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1">At least for the next few months, what happens overseas will be more important for the Australian economy than domestic factors per se.
Richard Holden, Professor of Economics and PLuS Alliance Fellow, UNSW
This article was originally published on <a href="http://theconversation.com" target="_blank">The Conversation</a>. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/vital-signs-how-inflation-in-china-and-the-us-could-affect-australia-96357" target="_blank">original article</a>.
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How inflation in China and the US could affect Australia: Richard Holden

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EXPERT OBSERVATION 
There is no shortage of repugnant and dangerous ideas in the world. An age old question is whether free speech will see good ideas win out over bad.
The proposition that good ideas eventually triumph in “the marketplace for ideas” dates at least to 1644, when John Milton wrote in his anti-censorship tract Areopagitica:
Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?
But it was perhaps first explicitly stated by United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1919, in his dissent to a 7–2 ruling in the Abrams v United States case involving the first amendment right to freedom of speech.
Holmes wrote:
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.
Old though this question may be, it is one that confronts us time and again. Is it more dangerous to stifle expression of a seemingly dangerous idea, or to let it be freely expressed?
It is central to the controversy over the New York Times publishing on June 3 an idea many found repugnant.
That idea was “an overwhelming show of force to disperse, detain and ultimately deter lawbreakers” as a response to widespread Black Lives Matter demonstrations and isolated outbreaks of violence and looting.
It was advocated in an op-ed piece by a US senator from Arkansas, Tom Cotton.
Editorial page editor James Bennet resigned as part of the paper’s mea culpa. A champion of the “marketplace of ideas” might argue the New York Times did the right thing, or at least nothing wrong.
So what would an economist, whose job is to understand market behaviour, say?
Economists and markets
The most celebrated result in all of economics – the “First Welfare Theorem” formalised by Nobel laureates Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu – states that with the right conditions competitive markets will allocate resources with maximum efficiency.
Yet economists – especially and including Arrow and Debreu – are all too aware that markets don’t always function well in reality. Information is often “asymmetric”, such as a seller knowing more about a product’s quality than the buyer. There are “externalities”, costs incurred by third parties, such as environmental harms not factored into market prices. Plenty of markets are not sufficiently competitive.
The failure of markets for insurance, used cars and many other things has been well-documented.
Why, then, why should we have faith in the marketplace for ideas?
Ideas are not products
Over the past two decades economists have been developing formal models that can speak to competition in ideas.
The stepping-off point is to note the nature of competition in an ideas market is fundamentally different from competition in a product market.
With products, sellers compete for customers by setting the price for their products. As the economists Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro put it:
Two firms compete [in the product market] if their products are substitutes from the perspective of consumers. A change in the price of one affects the purchasing behaviour of the other’s customers. This kind of competition is important because it limits firms’ ability to raise price above marginal cost.
Ideas differ in the following way:
Two firms compete in [an information market] if 1) they cover the same events and 2) at least some consumers will learn the facts reported by both. A change in the set of facts one reports affects the information of the other’s customers. This kind of competition limits firms’ ability to control consumers’ beliefs.
A form of prisoner’s dilemma
The cleanest formal model of competition between parties trying to control people’s beliefs comes from a 2017 paper by Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica (a former classmate and University of Chicago colleague of mine).
The “marketplace for ideas” notion holds that when there are more senders of information, more information will be communicated to consumers.
Gentzkow and Kamenica showed this is not necessarily so. It all depends on the nature of the strategic interaction between the senders of information.
Senders might be caught in a kind of Prisoner’s Dilemma, the game theory concept made famous by the movie A Beautiful Mind. It would be socially productive for more information to be revealed, but the private incentives of the senders lead to less revelation.
For example, consider two pharmaceuticals makers with drugs only they know the effectiveness of. One half of their market is customers who will only buy pharmaceuticals they believe likely to work well. The other half wants their drugs to work too, but they’ll also buy if it might only partially work.
In this case each maker has an incentive to withhold information about the efficacy of their product, even though they and the consumers would be better off if they and the rival revealed more information. It’s just like the consequences of unilateral action as shown in A Beautiful Mind.
If strategic interaction in the marketplace for ideas takes this form then competition does not lead to good arguments winning out.
Gentzkow and Kamenica show the crucial condition for competition to lead to more information being revealed is this: each sender must be able to unilaterally deviate to some outcome more informative for consumers. In the drug example, this would be each maker disclosing the efficacy of their own drug and that of their competitor.
Whether this happens in practice depends on important details about the nature of the ideas being discussed, what types of information are permissible by law, and of course whether those receiving information are rational.
In short, the answer to whether the marketplace for ideas leads good ideas to win out is: it depends.
Open discussion is not enough
Just because the marketplace for ideas doesn’t always work doesn’t mean it never works. There are deeply important non-economic reasons to value freedom of speech that extend beyond how much information gets revealed.
But modern economics teaches us that competition in the marketplace for ideas is different than competition in the market for ordinary goods and services. We should not always conclude that odious ideas will be consigned to the dustbin of history simply through open discussion.
Richard Holden is a Professor of Economics at UNSW
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Why ‘the marketplace for ideas’ can fail – from an economist’s perspective: Richard Holden

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The Carbon Risk Real Estate Monitor (CRREM) has announced the public release of decarbonisation pathways for the global real estate sector, and the finalisation of the tool to identify and manage transition risks for individual assets.
The pathways will reportedly help market participants meet the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).
The downscaling pathways published today on the CRREM website identify annual energy- and carbon-intensity trajectories until 2050 across real estate markets and sectors that are consistent with keeping global warming below 2 degrees Celsius.
This is a policy goal endorsed by most municipal and national governments and thereby constitutes a plausible scenario against which future climate-related transition risk can be assessed.
The major investors supporting CRREM aim to establish it as a global standard for developing long-term decarbonisation pathways in the real estate sector based on a transparent and scientifically rigorous methodology.
CRREM covers 28 countries in Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific across the commercial real estate sector, including retail, offices, and logistics, as well as the residential sector.
According to the organisation, real estate plays a major role in combatting climate change.
The construction and operation of buildings accounts for 39 percent of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions globally, and much higher percentages in densely populated urban centres.
This exposes the real estate sector to significant climate-related transition risk as governments have started to impose increasingly stringent regulations on energy use and emissions from buildings to meet their own climate goals.
Regulatory risk around energy and carbon is shaping market and technology trends in the real estate sector.
As temperature is projected to rise 3.8 degrees Celsius under current legislation, the decarbonisation pathways aligned with 1.5- and 2-degree global carbon budgets reflect significant reduction requirements beyond current legislative requirements.
CRREM estimates that the carbon-intensity of the building sector will globally have to decline from currently approx. 52 kgCO2e/m2/pa to below 10 kgCO2e/m2/pa by 2050 in order to be in line with the 2-degree global carbon budget.
Such a scenario would have significant implications for long-term asset planning and risk management in the sector – especially for developed countries which in some cases are facing 100 kgCO2e/m2/pa as a starting point for office buildings (based on a whole-building approach).
Calculation of the global reduction targets and the derived national targets for different asset classes in the real estate sector create added-value for investors.
Added value for example includes the transparent analysis of carbon risks, calculation of the abatement costs and analysing the correct timing of retrofit measures that are needed to minimize climate-related transition risk.
Along with the pathways, CRREM also finalized the development of a tool to manage stranding risk for individual buildings.
All information required is aligned with the information GRESB collects at the asset level in order to assess and benchmark the performance of real asset portfolios. The software is Excel-based and has undergone a significant testing phase. It is available on the crrem.eu website.
The decarbonisation pathways were developed by the Austria-based Institute for Real Estate Economics (IIÖ), with technical support from GRESB.
The initiative was funded by APG, PGGM and Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) and received further support from Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund and Ivanhoé Cambridge.
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Carbon Risk Real Estate Monitor announces decarbonisation plan

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GUEST OBSERVER
I just published a book, <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/economics-age-covid-19">Economics in the Age of COVID-19</a>.
It was written over the last month or so, peer-reviewed, edited and released by MIT Press.
<img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/331901/original/file-20200501-42951-xyyt58.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip" alt="">
This is the thoroughly-2020 story of how it happened.
Like many academics who entered our present period of isolation in mid-March, I was not at all concerned about my job and how to continue doing it.
To be sure, I would have to deal with purely online interactions with some 300 plus students but fortunately I twigged to the value of virtual lectures a few years ago.
Of course I would have to cancel all travel and conferences for the foreseeable future, but in some ways that thought was liberating.
And I would have to deal with motivating a <a href="https://www.joshuagans.com/parentonomics">teenager</a> to learn at home, and with two annoyed college students who had been forced to return home.
Obsession
For the first week I got nothing done, despite being free to do anything.
I couldn’t help but obsess over what was happening in the world.
At first it was frustration at the slow pace of government action as I constantly refreshed scant data on rising infections.
Then it was panic that those actions wouldn’t be enough.
The economic changes were unprecedented. The stock market gyrated and convulsed in tune with fear and other motives that none of us could understand.
What was clear was that if I was home, then so were most other people.
That would leave stores empty, factories shut, and services unnecessary. The vast majority of businesses rely on cash flow to keep things operating, and the cash was most definitely going to stop flowing.
While there were public health pandemic playbooks that were being followed with varying degrees of adherence, there was no economic playbook for this.
Playbook
No one had, to my knowledge, written a paper on how to shut down an economy and then simply restart it again at some unspecified time.
In my mind, the analogy was that we would have to pause things.
We happily shut down most economies each Christmas and no one screams “depression.” The easiest way to do this was to just delay bill payments without consequence.
I could think of ways to do it: loan guarantees, wage subsidies, straight out cash, moratoriums on evictions and foreclosures.
I started to write up my thoughts as if that were original and insightful. And then I saw all of my economics colleagues doing the same thing.
Everyone had simultaneously come to the same conclusion. A new playbook was being invented at the same time, all over the world.
Trillions of dollars were being spent, but it was clear to me that non-economists were somewhat dumbfounded.
Hadn’t economists warned for years against the perils of deficits? Would our children be paying for this? And what was the plan? How long was this going to last and how sure were we that we could just get things back to normal?
We economists had some answers to these questions, but not all of them.
Sharing
Like public health officials who needed to explain in far more detail what was going on with COVID-19, economists needed to explain what they were thinking when they were taking such unusual and exceptional steps.
A week into my isolation, I decided I would write a book.
It would cover all of the economic issues, conundrums and controversies that were emerging. It would put what we knew together with what we did not know and try to help people process what was happening.
It would help me get a handle it as well.
I have written <a href="https://www.joshuagans.com/parentonomics">popular</a> <a href="https://www.joshuagans.com/innovation-equality">economics</a> <a href="https://www.predictionmachines.ai/">books</a> before, but never as quickly.
My plan was to write 10 chapters – one a day – and then publish. In terms of that last step, I could self-publish, but, given the speed at which I was working, I couldn’t be confident I wouldn’t miss things. It had to be peer-reviewed.
Most academic publishers work slowly but I contacted MIT Press and asked if they could do things differently. They came through in ways that I did not anticipate.
As it turns out MIT Press had recently collaborated with the MIT Media Lab on a platform called <a href="https://www.pubpub.org/">PubPub</a>. It is built to allow public comment and review. The plan was for me to write the book and after an editorial review, post the entire thing to PubPub for open review by members of the public.
It was posted on <a href="https://economics-in-the-age-of-covid-19.pubpub.org/">April 7</a>, just 19 days after I first had the idea to write a book.
There were only 8 chapters, but they were longer than I had anticipated – 30,000 words in all. You can see that version <a href="https://economics-in-the-age-of-covid-19.pubpub.org/">here</a>.
Feedback
Then MIT Press sent it out to peer reviewers whom they pushed to return comments within a week.
In the meantime, I kept writing. Things were evolving quickly. More critically, economic research was flooding in as economists from all over the world diverted their energies from what they had been doing to researching different aspects of the crisis.
In the end, my guess is that 80% of the citations in the book were from two months in one year – March and April, 2020!
Finally, I had to incorporate a wealth of comments from open and peer review. The former (public comments) were actually more detailed and useful than the latter (peer comments), which raises issues for the future.
In the end, on April 22 (one week ahead of schedule), the electronic version of my book was published globally.
It was 40,000 words long and hopefully would remain relevant for a few months. It’s for sale <a href="https://www.joshuagans.com/economics-in-the-age-of-covid19">here</a>.
Do I recommend undertaking this type of challenge?
Next book
Overall, I am pleased there is something out there for people to read and digest.
But personally, it was more gruelling than I had anticipated. That wasn’t because of the intensity of the work, but because of its subject matter.
My other books were <a href="https://www.joshuagans.com/parentonomics">positive</a> and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Finishing-Job-Real-World-Solutions-Education-ebook/dp/B00I9CANXU/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1422105981&amp;sr=8-2&amp;keywords=finishing+the+job">optimistic</a>. This one was, for the most part, depressing. The first words were “everything is awful”, and it didn’t get better.
My editor called the first version of the ending bleak. There were days in which I was overwhelmed by my own words and had to retire to a couch until I could pick myself up again.
Thankfully, despite my own feelings, most of those who have read the book have come away concerned and informed, rather than lost and hopeless. That’s something.
The journey isn’t over. MIT Press will publish the usual version of the book in November. I will update it continually for a month or so before then.
There is still so much we do not know. We are learning more about COVID-19 and producing lots of studies, but I think the actual flow of knowledge has been disappointingly slow.
That’ll be the theme of the followup.<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137489/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important; text-shadow: none !important;">
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/joshua-gans-399">Joshua Gans</a>, Professor of Strategic Management, <a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-toronto-1281">University of Toronto</a>
This article is republished from <a href="https://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-i-wrote-and-published-a-book-about-the-economics-of-coronavirus-in-a-month-137489">original article</a>.
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Writing a book on the economics of coronavirus in a month: Joshua Gans

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EXPERT OBSERVER
The Westpac-Melbourne Institute Index of Consumer Sentiment plunged 17.7% to 75.6 in April from 91.9 in March.
This is the single biggest monthly decline in the forty seven year history of the survey, taking the Index beyond GFC lows to levels only seen during the deep recessions of the early 1990s (64.6) and early 1980s (75.5).
However, it is pertinent to note that the lows in previous recessions were reached after one to two years of continuous deterioration compared to the one month collapse we have seen here. Certainly we cannot rule out the Index dropping below the historic low of 64.6 we saw in November 1990.
The details of the survey which are discussed below are all very disturbing and reflect the large shocks to jobs and spending. However the most surprising message is the collapse in confidence in the housing market.
The survey comes after an extremely turbulent month in which the Coronavirus outbreak has evolved from serious concern to full-blown pandemic. Confirmed cases globally have soared from around one hundred thousand at the time of the last survey to nearly two million currently. In Australia, the number of cases has surged from just 76 a month ago to around 6,500.
Australian governments have instituted widespread shutdowns on movement and social activity that have effectively banned many forms of economic activity.
While the drop in confidence this month is severe, it could well have been worse. Despite the bleak and threatening backdrop, Australia’s pandemic experience to date has been much less debilitating than that of the hardest hit areas abroad.
The number of cases is high but has not overwhelmed Australia’s health system, with recent evidence showing a clear slowing in new cases that indicates policy measures are working to contain the spread.
These developments give some support to our view that the Australian economy will lift in the December quarter following three consecutive quarters of economic contraction.
We have also seen a swift and effective response from governments, highlighted by the Federal government’s $130 billion JobKeeper Payment scheme.
Westpac has estimated that without the Payment the unemployment rate would have soared to 17% by the end of June compared to a peak of 9% with the Payment scheme.
Note that previous recessions saw the unemployment rate peak at 11.2% (early 1990s) and 10.4% (early 1980s).
All five component sub-indexes fell in April. By far the biggest falls were in the near term outlook for the economy and in attitudes towards spending – reflecting the immediate effects of the shut-down.
The ‘economy, next 12 months’ sub-index recorded a spectacular 31% drop (the biggest monthly fall on record), taking it to 53.7. That compares to a low of 53.2 during the GFC and lows during previous recessions of 34.2 (early 1990s) and 42.1 (early 1980s).
Bill Evans is the Chief Economist at Westpac Banking Corporation
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